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a b s t r a c t
We propose a timed broadcasting process calculus for wireless systems where time-
consuming communications are exposed to collisions. The operational semantics of our
calculus is given in terms of a labelled transition system. The calculus enjoys a number of
desirable timeproperties such as (i) timedeterminism: the passage of time is deterministic;
(ii) patience: devices will wait indefinitely until they can communicate; (iii) maximal
progress: data transmissions cannot be delayed, theymust occur as soon as a possibility for
communication arises.We use our calculus tomodel and studyMAC-layer protocols with a
special emphasis on collisions and security. Themain behavioural equality of our calculus is
a timed variant of barbed congruence, a standard branching-time and contextually-defined
program equivalence. As an efficient proof method for timed barbed congruence we define
a labelled bisimilarity. We then apply our bisimulation proof-technique to prove a number
of algebraic laws.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Wireless technology spans from user applications such as personal area networks, ambient intelligence and wireless
local area networks, to real-time applications, such as cellular, and ad hoc networks. The IEEE 802.11 standard [22] contains
a series of specifications for wireless LAN technologies. The basic building block of an 802.11 network is the Basic Service Set
(BSS), which is a set of stations that have successfully synchronised and that use radio transceivers to broadcast messages.
In Independent BSS (IBSS), stations communicate with each other without using any distribution system. IBSS networks
are sometimes referred to as ad hoc networks. In this paper, we propose a formal model for IBSS networks paying particular
attention to communication interferences. Communication interferences represent one of themain concernswhen evaluating
the performance of a network in terms of network throughput, i.e. the average rate of successful message delivery over a
communication channel.
In concurrent systems, an interference occurs when the activity of a component is damaged or corrupted because of the
activities of another component. Communication channels in Ethernet-like networks are full-duplex; that is, a node can
transmit and receive at the same time. Thus, collisions caused by two simultaneous transmissions are immediately detected
and repaired by retransmitting themessage after a randomly-chosen period of time. This is not possible inwireless networks
where radio signals span over a limited area, called transmission cell, and channels are half-duplex: on a given channel, a
device can either transmit or receive, but cannot do both at the same time. As a consequence, communication collisions in
wireless systems can be only detected at destination.
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Many protocols for wireless networks rely on a common notion of time among the devices, provided by some clock
synchronisation protocol. Most clock synchronisation protocols for ad hoc networks [34,13,43,45,27,49] follow the ‘‘clock
correction’’ approach correcting the local clock of each node to run in parallelwith a global time scale.1 This approach heavily
relies on network connectivity. In a connected network all nodes are in touch with each other, although not always directly.
Wireless networks are usually assumed to be connected; disconnected devices can be considered as not being part of the
network as, in general, they need to re-authenticate to rejoin the network.
In the last twenty-five years, process calculi [30,8,31,10,21] have been intensively used to study the semantics of
concurrent/distributed systems, and to develop verification techniques for such systems. In the literature, there exist a
number of process calculi modelling wireless systems [25,36,44,29,16,17,14,15]. Most of these calculi support message loss
to model communication collisions. In fact, collisions in wireless systems cannot be avoided, although there are protocols to
reduce their occurrences (see, for instance, the IEEE 802.11 CSMA/CA protocol [22] for unicast communications).
In this paper, we propose a timed broadcasting calculus for wireless networks, called TCWS, in which all wireless devices
are assumed to be synchronised (relying on some clock-correction synchronisationprotocol). Thus, TCWS is a process calculus
with absolute timing, where all timing refers to an absolute clock. Time proceeds in discrete steps represented by occurrences
of a simple action σ , in the style of Hennessy and Regan’s TPL [20], to denote idling until the next clock cycle. The calculus is
value-passing andmessage transmission is time-consuming. As usual forwireless networks, the communicationmechanism
is (local) broadcast. As in Hennessy and Regan’s TPL [20] and Prasad’s TCBS [39], our calculus enjoys three basic time
properties:
• time determinism: the passage of time is deterministic, i.e. a network can reach at most one new state by performing the
action σ ;
• patience: nodes will wait indefinitely until they can communicate;
• maximal progress: data transmissions cannot be delayed, they must occur as soon as a possibility for communication
arises.
The operational semantics of our calculus is given in terms of a labelled transition system (LTS) in the SOS style of Plotkin.
We provide a notion of network well-formedness to take into account node-uniqueness, network connectivity, trans-
mission exposure, and transmission consistency. Then, we prove that our labelled transition semantics preserves network
well-formedness.
We use our calculus to model and study MAC-layer protocols, such as CSMA and CSMA/CA [22], and a wireless network
security protocol, called MiniSec [28].
A central concern in process calculi is to establish when two terms have the same observable behaviour, that is, they
are indistinguishable in any context. Behavioural equivalences are fundamental for justifying program transformations. Our
program equivalence is a timed variant of (weak) reduction barbed congruence, a branching-time contextually-defined
program equivalence. Barbed equivalences [32] are intuitive but difficult to use due to the quantification on all contexts.
Simpler proof techniques are based on labelled bisimilarities [30], which are co-inductive relations that characterise the
behaviour of processes using a labelled transition system. We define a labelled bisimilarity which is a proof method for
timed reduction barbed congruence. We then apply our bisimulation proof-technique to prove a number of algebraic laws.
We end this introduction with an outline of the paper. In Section 2, we provide both syntax and operational semantics
of our calculus. In the same section we propose a notion of network well-formedness to rule out inconsistent networks. In
Section 3, we prove that TCWS enjoys time determinism, maximal progress and patience. In Section 4, we use an extended
version of our calculus to specify and study a number of protocols. In Section 5,we equip TCWSwith a notion of observational
equivalence along the lines of Milner and Sangiorgi’s barbed congruence. In Section 6, we propose a labelled bisimilarity as
a proof method for our observations equivalence. More precisely, we prove that our bisimilarity is a congruence and that it
implies our observational equivalence.We then use our bisimilarity to prove a number of algebraic laws. Finally, in Section 7
we present, in some detail, future and related works.
2. The calculus
In Table 1,we define the syntax of TCWS in a two-level structure, a lower one for processes and an upper one for networks.
We use letters a, b, c, . . . for logical names, x, y, z for variables, u for values, and v andw for closed values, i.e. values that do
not contain variables. Closed values actually denote messages that are transmitted as TCP/IP packets. We write u˜ to denote
a tuple u1, . . . , uk of values.
Networks are collections of nodes (which represent devices) running in parallel and using a unique common channel to
communicate with each other. We use the symbol 0 to denote the empty network, while M1 | M2 represents the parallel
composition of two sub-networks M1 and M2. The communication paradigm is local broadcast; only nodes located in the
range of the transmitter may receive data. We write n[W ]νt for a node named n (the device network address) executing the
sequential processW . The variable t is a semantic tag ranging over positive integers to represent node exposure. Thus, a node
1 An excellent survey of existing clock synchronisation protocols for sensor networks (and more generally for ad-hoc networks) can be found in [46].
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Table 1
The syntax.
Networks:
M,N ::= 0 Empty network M | N Parallel composition n[W ]νt Node
Processes:
W ::= P Inactive process A Active process
P,Q ::= nil Termination !⟨u⟩.P Broadcast ⌊?(x).P⌋Q Receiver with timeout ⌊τ .P⌋Q Internal with timeout σ .P Delay [u1 = u2]P,Q Matching H⟨u˜⟩ Recursion
A ::= ⟨v⟩t .P Active sender (x)v .P Active receiver
n[W ]νt , with t > 0, is exposed to a transmission (or more transmissions) for the next t instants of time. The tag ν denotes
the set of (the names of) the neighbours of n. Said in other words, ν contains all nodes in the transmission cell of n, except
for n itself (n ∉ ν).2 Our wireless networks have a fixed topology where nodes cannot be created or destroyed. Furthermore
all nodes have the same transmission range.3
Processes are sequential and live within the nodes. For convenience, we distinguish between non-active and active
processes. An active process is a process which is currently transmitting or receiving. An active node is a node with an active
process inside. The symbol nil denotes the skip process. The sender process !⟨v⟩.P allows to broadcast the value v. Once the
transmission starts the process evolves into the active sender process ⟨v⟩δv .P which transmits the message v for the next δv
time units, the time necessary to transmit v. The process ⌊?(x).P⌋Q denotes a receiver with timeout. Intuitively, this process
either starts receiving a valuew in the current instant of time, evolving into an active receiver (x)w.P , or it idles for one time
unit, and then continues as Q . Notice that only when the reception terminates and the channel becomes free the active
receiver does the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) to verify the integrity of the received packets. Upon successful reception
the variable x of P is instantiated with the transmitted message w. The process ⌊τ .P⌋Q either performs an internal action,
in the current time interval, and then continues as P , or it idles for one time unit, and then continues as Q . The process σ .P
models sleeping for one time unit. Process [v1 = v2]P,Q is the standard ‘‘if then else’’ construct: it behaves as P if v1 = v2,
and as Q otherwise. In processes σ .P , ⌊τ .P⌋Q , ⌊?(x).P⌋Q , and !⟨v⟩.P the occurrence of processes P and Q are said to be
guarded.Wewrite H⟨v˜⟩ to denote a process defined bymeans of an equation of the formH(x˜) = P , with | x˜ |=| v˜ |, where x˜
contains all variables that appear free in P . Defining equations provide guarded recursion, since P may only contain guarded
occurrences of process identifiers, such as H itself.
Remark 2.1. The recursion construct allows us to define a persistent listener, i.e. a receiver which waits indefinitely for
an incoming message. With an abuse of notation, we will write ?(x).P to indicate such listener process, defined via the
following recursive equation Rcv = ⌊?(x).P⌋Rcv. Similarly, we will write τ .P as an abbreviation for the process defined as
Tau = ⌊τ .P⌋Tau.
In the terms ⌊?(x).P⌋Q and (x)v.P the variable x is bound in P . This gives rise to the standard notion of α-conversion. We
identify processes and networks up to α-conversion. We assume there are no free variables in our networks. The absence
of free variables in networks is trivially maintained as the network evolves. We write {v/x}P for the substitution of the
variable xwith the value v in P . We define structural congruence, written≡, as the smallest congruence induced by the laws
in Table 2, which is a commutative monoid with respect to the parallel operator. For convenience, structural congruence
includes equalities to deal with matching and recursion. We use a number of notational conventions.
∏
i∈I Mi means the
parallel composition of all sub-networksMi, for i ∈ I . We identify∏i∈I Mi = 0 if I = ∅. We write !⟨v⟩ for !⟨v⟩.nil, and ⟨v⟩δ
2 We could have represented the topology in terms of a restriction operator à la CCS over node names; we preferred our notation to keep at hand the
neighbours of a node.
3 These assumptions are discussed in the last section of the paper.
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Table 2
Structural congruence.
n[[v = v]P,Q ]νt ≡ n[P]νt (Struct Then)
n[[v1 = v2]P,Q ]νt ≡ n[Q ]νt if v1 ≠ v2 (Struct Else)
n[A⟨v˜⟩]νt ≡ n[{v˜/˜x}P]νt if A(x˜) = P ∧ | x˜ |=| v˜ | (Struct Rec)
M | N ≡ N | M (Struct Par Comm)
(M | N) | M ′ ≡ M | (N | M ′) (Struct Par Assoc)
M | 0 ≡ M (Struct Zero Par)
M ≡ M (Struct Refl)
M ≡ N implies N ≡ M (Struct Symm)
M ≡ M ′ ∧M ′ ≡ M ′′ impliesM ≡ M ′′ (Struct Trans)
M ≡ N impliesM | M ′ ≡ N | M ′ , for allM ′ (Struct Ctx Par)
Table 3
LTS — Synchronisation and internal actions.
(Snd)
−
m[!⟨v⟩.P]νt
m!v−−−→ m[⟨v⟩δv .P]νt
(Rcv)
m ∈ ν
n[⌊?(x).P⌋Q ]ν0
m?v−−−→ n[(x)v .P]νδv
(RcvPar)
M
m?v−−−→ M ′ N m?v−−−→ N ′
M | N m?v−−−→ M ′ | N ′
(Sync)
M
m!v−−−→ M ′ N m?v−−−→ N ′
M | N m!v−−−→ M ′ | N ′
(Coll)
m ∈ ν t ′:=max(t,δv)
n[(x)w .P]νt
m?v−−−→ n[(x)⊥.P]νt ′
(Exp)
m∈ν W≠(x)w .P t ′:=max(t,δv)
n[W ]νt
m?v−−−→ n[W ]νt ′
(OutRng)
m ∉ ν m ≠ n
n[W ]νt
m?v−−−→ n[W ]νt
(Zero)
−
0
m?v−−−→ 0
(Tau)
−
m[⌊τ .P⌋Q ]ν τ−−→ m[P]ν
(TauPar)
M
τ−−→ M ′
M | N τ−−→ M ′ | N
for ⟨v⟩δ.nil. We recall that in the active sender process ⟨v⟩t .P it holds that t > 0. However, sometimes, for convenience, we
write ⟨v⟩0.P assuming the syntactic equality ⟨v⟩0.P = P .
Here are some definitions that will be useful in the remainder of the paper. Given a network M , nds(M) returns the
names of the nodes which constitute the networkM . For any networkM , actsnd(M) and actrcv(M) return the set of active
senders and active receivers ofM , respectively. Thus, for instance, for N = m[!⟨w⟩]νt | n[⟨v⟩r .P]ν
′
t ′ we have nds(N) = {m, n}
and actsnd(N) = {n}. Given a networkM and an active sender n ∈ actsnd(M), the function active(n,M) says for how long
the node n will be transmitting. For instance, if N is the network defined as before, active(n,N) = r . If n is not an active
sender then active(n,N) = 0. Finally, given a network M and a node m ∈ nds(M), the function ngh(m,M) returns the set
of neighbours ofm inM . Thus, for N defined as above ngh(m,N) = ν.
2.1. The operational semantics
We have divided our LTS in two sets of rules corresponding to the two main phases of a wireless transmission. Table 3
contains the rules to model both initial synchronisations between a sender and its neighbours, and internal computations
within single nodes. Table 4 contains the rules for modelling time passing and transmission ending.
Let us comment on the rules of Table 3. The metavariable λ ranges over the set of labels {τ ,m!v,m?v} denoting internal
action, broadcasting and reception, respectively. Rule (Snd)models a node starting a broadcast ofmessage v to its neighbours
in ν. By maximal progress, a node which is ready to transmit will not be delayed. A transmission fires even if there are no
listeners: sending is a non-blocking action. Rule (Rcv) models the beginning of the reception of a message v transmitted by
a station m. This happens only when the receiver is not exposed to other transmissions i.e. when the exposure indicator is
equal to zero. The exposure indicator is then updated because node n will be exposed for the next δv instants of time. The
reception will finish only when the receiver senses the channel free for a whole time interval (see rule (RcvEnd) of Table 4).
Rule (RcvPar) serves to synchronise different receivers on the same transmission originating from a nodem. Rule (Sync) serves
to synchronise a broadcasting nodemwith receivers. In rule (Coll) an active receivern is exposed to a transmission originating
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Fig. 1. Network topology of Example 2.2.
Table 4
LTS — Time passing/End transmission.
(σ -Nil)
−
n[nil]νt
σ−−→ n[nil]νt−1
(Sleep)
−
n[σ .P]νt
σ−−→ n[P]νt−1
(σ -Rcv)
−
n[⌊?(x).P⌋Q ]ν0
σ−−→ n[Q ]ν0
(σ -Fail)
t > 0
n[⌊?(x).P⌋Q ]νt
σ−−→ n[(x)⊥.P]νt−1
(σ -Tau)
−
n[⌊τ .P⌋Q ]νt
σ−−→ n[Q ]νt−1
(ActSnd)
r > 0
n[⟨v⟩r .P]νt
σ−−→ n[⟨v⟩r−1.P]νt−1
(ActRcv)
t > 0
n[(x)v .P]νt
σ−−→ n[(x)v .P]νt−1
(RcvEnd)
−
n[(x)v .P]ν0
σ−−→ n[{v/x}P]ν0
(σ -Zero)
−
0
σ−−→ 0
(σ -Par)
M
σ−−→ M ′ N σ−−→ N ′
M | N σ−−→ M ′ | N ′
fromanodem. This transmission gives rise to a collision atn. Rule (Exp)models the exposure of a noden (which is not an active
receiver) to a transmission originating from a transmitterm. In this case, n does not take part in the transmission. Notice that
a node n[⌊?(x).P⌋Q ]ν0 might execute rule (Exp) instead of (Rcv). This is because a potential (synchronised) receivermightmiss
the synchronisation with the sender for several reasons (internal misbehaving, radio signals problems, etc). Such a situation
will give rise to a failure in reception at n (see rule (σ -Fail) in Table 4). Rule (OutRng) regards nodes which are out of the
range of a transmission originating from a nodem. Rule (Zero) is similar but regards empty networks. Rule (Tau)models local
computations. Rule (TauPar) serves to propagate internal computations on parallel components. Rules (Sync) and (TauPar)
have their symmetric counterpart.
Let us explain the rules in Table 3 with an example.
Example 2.2. Consider the network
Net def= k[!⟨v⟩.?(x).P]νk0
 l[?(x).Q ]νl0  m[!⟨w⟩]νm0  n[?(y).R]νn0
where νk = {l,m, l′}, νl = {k,m}, νm = {k, l, n, l′,m′} and νn = {m} (see Fig. 1). There are two possible broadcast
communications originating from stations k and m, respectively. Let us suppose k starts broadcasting. By applying rules
(Snd), (Rcv), (Exp), (OutRng), (RcvPar) and (Sync)we have
Net
k!v−−−→ k[⟨v⟩δv .?(x).P]νk0
 l[(x)v.Q ]νlδv  m[!⟨w⟩]νmδv  n[?(y).R]νn0
= Net1.
By maximal progress,m cannot delay its transmission. Supposing δv < δw we have
Net1
m!w−−−−→ k[⟨v⟩δv .?(x).P]νkδw
 l[(x)⊥.Q ]νlδw  m[⟨w⟩δw ]νmδv  n[(y)w.R]νnδw
= Net2.
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Table 5
LTS — matching and recursion.
(Then)
n[P]νt
λ−−→ n[P ′]νt ′
n[[v = v]P,Q ]νt
λ−−→ n[P ′]νt ′
(Else)
n[Q ]νt
λ−−→ n[Q ′]νt ′ v1 ≠ v2
n[[v1 = v2]P,Q ]νt
λ−−→ n[Q ′]νt ′
(Rec)
n[{v˜/˜x}P]νt
λ−−→ n[P ′]νt ′ H(x˜) def= P
n[H⟨v˜⟩]νt
λ−−→ n[P ′]νt ′
Now, node l is exposed to a collision and its reception is doomed to fail. Notice that, although nodemwas already exposed
when it started transmitting, node nwill receive correctly the messagew fromm.
Let us comment on rules of Table 4. Rule (σ -Nil) is straightforward: it simply decreases the exposure tag of the node. This
updating of the exposure tag appears in all rules of Table 4, where we assume an arithmetic for positive integers such that
0 − 1 = 0. Rule (Sleep) models sleeping for one time unit. In rule (σ -Rcv) a timeout fires if no reception has started. Rule
(σ -Fail) models a failure of an exposed receiver. This may happen, for instance, when a receiver wakes up in the middle of
an ongoing transmission. In rule (σ -Tau) a timeout can fire if no internal actions are executed. Rules (ActSnd) and (ActRcv)
represent the passage of time for active senders and active receivers, respectively. When the transmission is over, active
senders simple evolve to the next state (we recall that, by convention, ⟨v⟩0.P = P). On the other hand, active receivers stop
receiving only when the channel becomes idle. The end of a reception of a message v is modelled in rule (RcvEnd). As the
communication is half-duplex this happens when the receiver senses the channel idle for one time unit. Rule (σ -Zero) is
straightforward. Rule (σ -Par)models time synchronisation among the devices.
Example 2.3. Let us continue with the previous example. Let us show how the system evolves after δv and δw time units.
We recall that 0 < δv < δw . For simplicity let us define δ := δw − δv:
Net2 (
σ−−→)δv k[?(x).P]νkδ
 l[(x)⊥.Q ]νlδ  m[⟨w⟩δ]νm0  n[(y)w.R]νnδ
σ−−→ k[(x)⊥.P]νkδ−1
 l[(x)⊥.Q ]νlδ−1  m[⟨w⟩δ−1]νm0  n[(y)w.R]νnδ−1
(
σ−−→)δ−1 k[(x)⊥.P]νk0
 l[(x)⊥.Q ]νl0  m[nil]νm0  n[(y)w.R]νn0
σ−−→ k[{⊥/x}P]νk0
 l[{⊥/x}Q ]νl0  m[nil]νm0  n[{w/y}R]νn0 .
Notice that, after δv instants of time, node kwill start a reception in the middle of an ongoing transmission (the transmitter
beingm). This will lead to a failure at k.
In Table 5we report the obvious rules for nodes containingmatching and recursive processes (we recall that only guarded
recursion is allowed).
In the remainder of this article we will use the notion of execution trace. A trace is a sequence of labelled transitions. If
Λ is a sequence of labels λ1λ2 . . . λn, with λi ≠ τ for 1≤i≤n, we writeM ΛHH⇒ N to mean
M(
τ−−→)∗ λ1−−→ ( τ−−→)∗ . . . ( τ−−→)∗ λn−−→ ( τ−−→)∗N
where (
τ−−→)∗ denotes the reflexive and transitive closure of τ−−→.
Below, we report a number of basic properties of our LTS.
Proposition 2.4. Let M, M1 and M2 be networks.
1. m ∉ nds(M) if and only if M m?v−−−→ M ′, for some network M ′.
2. M1 | M2 m?v−−−→ N if and only if there are N1 and N2 such that M1 m?v−−−→ N1, M2 m?v−−−→ N2 and N = N1 | N2.
3. If M
m!v−−−→ M ′ then M ≡ m[!⟨v⟩.P]νt | N, for some ν , t , P and N, and there is N ′ such that m[!⟨v⟩.P]νt
m!v−−−→ m[⟨v⟩δv .P]νt ,
N
m?v−−−→ N ′ and M ′ ≡ m[⟨v⟩δv .P]νt | N ′.
4. If M
τ−−→ M ′ thenM ≡ m[⌊τ .P⌋Q ]νt | N, for somem, ν , t , P , Q andN such thatm[⌊τ .P⌋Q ]νt
τ−−→ m[P]νt andM ′ ≡ m[P]νt | N.
5. M1 | M2 σ−−→ N if and only if there are N1 and N2 such that M1 σ−−→ N1, M2 σ−−→ N2 and N = N1 | N2.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
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2.2. Well-formedness
The syntax presented in Table 1 allows us to derive inconsistent networks, i.e. networks that do not have a realistic
counterpart. Below we give a number of definitions to rule out ill-formed networks. We recall that ≡ denotes structural
congruence.
As network addresses are unique, we assume that there cannot be two nodes with the same name in the same network.
Definition 2.5 (Node Uniqueness). A networkM is said to be node-unique if wheneverM ≡ M1 | m[W1]νt | n[W2]ν
′
t ′ it holds
thatm ≠ n.
We also assume network connectivity, i.e. all nodes are connected to each other, although not always directly. This is
because time synchronisation can be achieved only in connected networks. Moreover, in our networks, all nodes have the
same transmission range. Formally,
Definition 2.6 (Network Connectivity). A networkM is said to be connected if
• wheneverM ≡ N | m[W1]νt | n[W2]ν
′
t ′ withm ∈ ν ′ it holds that n ∈ ν;• for all m, n ∈ nds(M) there is a sequence of nodes m1, . . . ,mk ∈ nds(M), with neighbouring ν1, . . . , νk, respectively,
such thatm=m1, n=mk andmi ∈ νi+1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k−1.
The next definition is about the consistency of exposure indicators of nodes. Intuitively, the exposure indicators of
active senders and active receivers must be consistent with their current activity (transmission/reception). Moreover, the
neighbours of active senders must have their exposure indicators consistent with the duration of the transmission.
Definition 2.7 (Exposure Consistency). AnetworkM is said to be exposure-consistent if the following conditions are satisfied.
1. IfM ≡ N | m[(x)v.P]νt , with v ≠ ⊥, then 0 ≤ t ≤ δv .
2. IfM ≡ N | m[⟨v⟩r .P]νt , then r ≤ δv .
3. IfM ≡ N | m[⟨v⟩r .P]νt | n[W ]ν
′
t ′ , withm ∈ ν ′, then 0 < r ≤ t ′.
4. LetM ≡ N | n[W ]νt with t>0. If active(k,N) ≠ t for all k in ν∩actsnd(N), then there is k′ in ν\nds(N) such thatwhenever
N ≡ N ′ | l[W ′]ν′t ′ , with k′ ∈ ν ′, then t ′ ≥ t .
The next definition is about the consistency of transmitting stations. The first and the second part are about successful
transmissions, while the third part is about collisions.
Definition 2.8 (Transmission Consistency). A networkM is said to be transmission-consistent if the following conditions are
satisfied.
1. IfM ≡ N | n[(x)v.Q ]νt and v ≠ ⊥, then | actsnd(N) ∩ ν | ≤ 1.
2. IfM ≡ N | m[⟨w⟩r .P]νt | n[(x)v.Q ]ν
′
t ′ , withm ∈ ν ′ and v ≠ ⊥, then (i) v = w, and (ii) r = t ′.
3. IfM ≡ N | n[(x)v.P]νt , with | actsnd(N) ∩ ν |> 1, then v = ⊥.
Definition 2.9 (Well-formedness). A network M is said to be well-formed if it is node-unique, connected, exposure-
consistent and transmission-consistent.
We prove that network well-formedness is preserved at runtime. In particular, the preservation of exposure- and
transmission-consistency are the more interesting and delicate results.
Theorem 2.10 (Subject Reduction). If M is a well-formed network, and M
λ−−→ M ′ for some label λ and network M ′, then M ′ is
well-formed as well.
Proof. By transition induction. 
3. Time properties
We start proving three desirable time properties of TCWS: time determinism, patience and maximal progress.
Theorem3.1 formalises the deterministic nature of time passing: a network can reach atmost one new state by executing
the action σ .
Theorem 3.1 (Time Determinism). Let M be a well-formed network. If M
σ−−→ M ′ and M σ−−→ M ′′ then M ′ and M ′′ are
syntactically the same.
Proof. By induction on the length of the proof ofM
σ−−→ M ′. 
In [20,39], the maximal progress property says that processes communicate as soon as a possibility of communication
arises. However, unlike [20,39], in our calculus message transmission requires a positive amount of time. So, we generalise
the property saying that transmissions cannot be delayed.
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Theorem 3.2 (Maximal Progress). Let M be a well-formed network. If there is N such that M
m!v−−−→ N then M σ−−→ M ′ for no
network M ′.
Proof. Because sender nodes cannot perform σ -actions. 
The last time property is patience. In [20,39] patience guarantees that a process will wait indefinitely until it can
communicate. In our setting, this means that if no transmission can start then it must be possible to execute a σ -action
to let time pass.
Theorem 3.3 (Patience). Let M be a well-formed network. If M
m!v−−−→ M ′ for no network M ′ then there is a network N such that
M
σ−−→ N.
Proof. By contradiction and then by induction on the structure ofM . 
4. Case studies
The calculus defined in Section 2 should be considered as a core language for the specification of wireless systems. As
many other process calculi, TCWS can be extendedwith useful constructs (basically, syntactic sugar) which do not introduce
new concepts. We report below the extensions we are interested in. For commodity, values are extended with functions.4
We adopt a polyadic version of the calculus where tuple of values are transmitted. Thus, for instance, the process !⟨v, v′, w⟩.
P denotes the broadcast of a tuple containing three values. We assume standard tuple destructors fst(), snd(), etc. returning
the corresponding component of a tuple, if it exists, and the value ⊥ otherwise. The matching construct [u = w]P,Q is
extended to check the conjunction and/or disjunction of more equalities. Last but not least, in the process definition we
assume also process variables; this is not a big extension as values in TCWS represent data packets, so they can also contain
code. We call extended TCWS the calculus obtained by extending the syntax of TCWS with the just mentioned constructs.
The operational semantics of these constructs is completely standard.
The goal of this section is to show the expressiveness of our extended TCWS by defining a number protocols/applications.
We start with MAC-layer protocols, such as CSMA and CSMA/CA then we pass to study a sensor network link layer security
protocol, called MiniSec.
4.1. Carrier Sense Multiple Access
The Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) scheme [22] is a widely used MAC-layer protocol in which a device senses
the channel (physical carrier sense) before transmitting. More precisely, if the channel is sensed free, the sender starts
transmitting immediately (i.e. in the next instant of time 5); if the channel is busy (i.e. some other station is transmitting)
the device keeps listening the channel until it becomes idle and then starts transmitting immediately. This strategy is called
1-persistent CSMA. More generally, in a p-persistent CSMA strategy (where p is a probability) the sender transmits with
probability p, and waits for the next available time slot, with probability 1− p.
In our calculus,we can easilymodel the 1-persistent CSMAschemeusing receiverswith timeoutwhere the sender process
!⟨v⟩.P is replaced by the process defined below:
!!⟨v⟩.P def= ⌊?(x).!⟨v⟩.P⌋!⟨v⟩.P.
The next example shows how 1-persistent CSMA affects the behaviour of a wireless system. Let us consider the network:
Net def= k[!!⟨v⟩.?(x).P]νk0
 l[?(x).Q ]νl0  m[σ .!!⟨w⟩]νm0  n[?(y).R]νn0
where νk = {l,m, l′}, νl = {k,m}, νm = {k, l, n, l′,m′} and νn = {m} (see Fig. 1 at page 6589). Here, node k senses the
channel free and, according to the CSMA scheme, in the next instant of time, it will start transmitting. Thus,
Net
σ−−→ k[!⟨v⟩.?(x).P]νk0
 l[?(x).Q ]νl0  m[!!⟨w⟩]νm0  n[?(y).R]νn0= Net1.
In Net1, node m is currently listening the channel to check whether it is free. By applying rules (Snd), (Rcv), (Exp), (OutRng),
(RcvPar) and (Sync) node k can start transmitting:
Net1
k!v−−−→ k[⟨v⟩δv .?(x).P]νk0
 l[(x)v.Q ]νlδv  m[(x)v.!⟨w⟩]νmδv  n[?(y).R]νn0= Net2.
4 Functions are already implicitly used in the core calculus when writing δv to denote the time necessary to transmit value v: δ() is a function that given
a data value v returns an integer.
5 We recall that in wireless systems channels are half-duplex.
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Fig. 2. Exposed and hidden terminal problems.
Now, since khas already started its transmission, nodem senses the channel busy and itmustwait until the channel becomes
free. Notice that in this manner there are no collisions at l and/or k. In fact, after δv instants of time we have
Net2 (
σ−−→)δv k[?(x).P]νk0
 l[(x)v.Q ]νl0  m[(x)v.!⟨w⟩]νm0  n[?(y).R]νn0
σ−−→ k[?(x).P]νk0
 l[{v/x}Q ]νl0  m[!⟨w⟩]νm0  n[?(y).R]νn0
= Net3
where node l has successfully received value v from k. Notice that after δv instants of time nodem senses the channel free,
and by maximal progress it will start transmitting in the next instant of time.
However, using a CSMA scheme, there is always a chance of stations starting transmitting at exactly the same time,
caused by the fact that different stations sensed the medium free and decided to transmit at once. As an example, consider
the network:
Net ′ def= k[!!⟨v⟩.?(x).P]νk0
 l[?(x).Q ]νl0  m[!!⟨w⟩]νm0  n[?(y).R]νn0
with the same communication topology as before. In this scenario, both nodes k andmwant to start transmitting. And since
both of them sense the channel free, they will start transmitting in the next instant of time. Thus, assuming δv < δw , we
have
Net ′
σ−−→ k[!⟨v⟩.?(x).P]νk0
 l[?(x).Q ]νl0  m[!⟨w⟩]νm0  n[?(y).R]νn0
k!v−−−→ k[⟨v⟩δv .?(x).P]νk0
 l[(x)v.Q ]νlδv  m[!⟨w⟩]νmδv  n[?(y).R]νn0
m!w−−−−→ k[⟨v⟩δv .?(x).P]νkδw
 l[(x)⊥.Q ]νlδw  m[⟨w⟩δw ]νmδv  n[(y)w.R]νnδw .
In this situation, node l is exposed to a collision caused by the two transmissions.
It should be pointed out that the CSMA scheme is not always a good idea. Let us consider, for instance, the previous
network Net where nodes l andm are not neighbours anymore, that is νl = {k} and νm = {k, n, l′,m′} (see the first picture
in Fig. 2). Now, suppose that m wants to send a message to n. Then, the CSMA scheme delays the transmission without
any reason, only becausem is exposed to the transmission originating from k. This is a well-known problem, introduced by
CSMA, called exposed terminal problem.
The CSMA scheme suffers another well-known problem called hidden terminal problem. This happens when two
transmitters sense the channel free, because they are not in each other’s transmission cell, and start transmitting causing a
collision to a third node lying in the transmission cells of both. As an example, you can consider, for instance, the previous
network Net with the following communication topology: νk = {l, l′}, νl = {k,m}, νm = {l, n, l′,m′} and νn = {m} (see
the second picture in Fig. 2). In this case, both transmissions at k and m will fire causing (after two instants of time) an
interference at l.
4.1.1. Collision avoidance
In unicast communications, to reduce the number of collisions due to the hidden terminal problem, the CSMA scheme
may be used with a Collision Avoidance (CA) mechanism together with a Positive Acknowledgement Scheme. With the latter,
receivers check the integrity of the data frame and if no errors occur they send an acknowledgement (ack) to the sender.
Reception of the ack ensures the transmitter that the data framehas been successfully received. If the sender does not receive
the ack frame, then the receivermight have not received the data. In this case, the senderwill try to retransmit the data frame
for a given number of times.
The Collision Avoidance mechanism is achieved by distributing reservation information announcing the impending use
of the medium. This mechanism is also called virtual carrier sense. A device wishing to transmit a data frame will first
transmit a short control packet RTS (request to send), which will include the source, the destination, and the duration of
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Table 6
CSMA/CA.
Sender at m:
SND(m, v, n, P) def=⌊?(x). Do physical carrier sense,
[x1 = rts ∨ x1 = cts] If a RTS/CTS is received
NAV⟨x4, SND⟨m, v, n, P⟩⟩, update the NAV,
SND⟨m, v, n, P⟩⌋ otherwise, restart.
!⟨rts,m, n, δ⟩.σ .CTS⟨m, v, n, P⟩ If channel is free send RTS.
CTS(m, v, n, P) def=⌊?(x).
[x = (cts,m, n, ·)] If the right CTS is received
!⟨v⟩.σ .ACK⟨m, v, n, P⟩, then start transmitting v,
NAV⟨bo(m), SND⟨m, v, n, P⟩⟩⌋ if not then wait for bo(m)
NAV⟨bo(m), SND⟨m, v, n, P⟩⟩ If timeout wait for bo(m).
ACK(m, v, n, P) def=⌊?(x).[x = (ack,m, n)]P, If ACK is received then P
SND⟨m, v, n, P⟩⌋ else, restart transmission.
SND⟨m, v, n, P⟩ If timeout restart transmission.
NAV(δ,Q ) def=[δ = 0]Q , ⌊?(x). If NAV is zero then Q , else
[x1 = rts ∨ x1 = cts] if a RTS/CTS is received,
NAV⟨max(x4, δ)−δx−1,Q ⟩, then update the NAV
NAV⟨δ−δx−1,Q ⟩⌋ else decrease the NAV.
NAV⟨δ−1,Q ⟩ If timeout decrease the NAV.
Receiver at n:
RCV(n, y, R) def=⌊?(x).
[x1 = rts] If a RTS packet is received
[x3 = n] with destination n
!⟨cts, x2, n, x4⟩.σ .R′, then reply with a CTS pkt
NAV⟨x4, RCV⟨n, y, R⟩⟩, otherwise, update the NAV
[x1 = cts] if a CTS is received
NAV⟨x4, RCV⟨n, y, R⟩⟩, update the NAV,
RCV⟨n, y, R⟩⌋ otherwise restart.
RCV⟨n, y, R⟩ If timeout then restart.
R′ def=⌊?(y).[y = ⊥] Receive data and check it
RCV⟨n, y, R⟩, if there is a collision restart
!⟨ack, x4, n⟩.σ .R⌋ otherwise, ack and continue.
RCV⟨n, y, R⟩ If timeout restart reception.
the whole transaction (i.e. the transmission of the data frame together with the returning ack frame). If the medium is free,
the destination station will respond with a control packet called CTS (clear to send), which will include the same duration
information. All stations receiving either the RTS (from the sender) and/or the CTS (from the receiver), will learn of the
medium reservation. More precisely, they will set their network allocation vector (NAV) register to the maximum among
the current value stored in their NAV and the duration time carried in the RTS/CTS frame. The NAV may be thought of as a
counter, which counts down to zero at a uniform rate. When the NAV is zero, the virtual carrier sense indication is that the
medium is idle; when nonzero, the medium is supposed to be busy and the station must remain silent. Upon receiving an
RTS, a node returns a CTS frame only if its NAV value is zero, otherwise no CTS is sent. Thus, a sender will see no CTS if its
RTS packet has collided with another transmission at the receiver, or if the receiver’s NAV indicates that the network is not
available. In this case, the transmitter will repeat the process according to some backoff algorithm.
The goal of the RTS/CTS mechanism is to reduce the probability of a collision at the receiver to the short duration of the
RTS transmission. In fact, if a station hears the CTS then it ‘‘reserves’’ the medium as busy until the end of the transmission.
The duration field in the RTS frame also protects the transmitter area from potential collisions during the reception of the
ack (by stations that are out of range from the acknowledging station).
Notice that the virtual carrier sense cannot be applied tomulticast and broadcast packets because therewould bemultiple
recipients for the RTS, and thus potentiallymultiple concurrent senders of the corresponding CTS. Notice also that the virtual
carrier senseworks correctly under the assumption that all devices have the same transmission range. In order to understand
that, think of two nodes m and n such that n is in the transmission range of m but not vice versa. Suppose that n receives a
RTS frame from another node and sends it back the CTS frame starting the reception of the data frame. In this scenario, since
the nodem did not hear the CTS frame it could start transmitting causing an interference at n.
In Table 6, we provide an encoding of a sender and a receiver process, written in our extended TCWS, and respecting the
CSMA/CA protocol. For brevity, in sub-terms of the form ?(x).P , instead of using the standard tuple destructors, we write xi
in P to mean the i-th component of the tuple that will be received at x, if this component is defined, and⊥ otherwise.
The process SND(m, v, n, P) runs at node m and tries to transmit the value v to node n, being P the continuation. The
sending takes into account both physical and virtual carrier sense. If the channel is sensed free the process sends an RTS
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packet and then, in the next time interval, move to process CTS⟨m, v, n, P⟩ to wait for the CTS packet. If the CTS packet
is not received in the current instant of time, the process will remain silent for an amount of time calculated by means of
a backoff algorithm/function bo(). For simplicity, our backoff function depends on the logical address of the node; thus,
different nodes have different backoff periods. When the CTS is received the value v is transmitted. Then, the sender moves
to state ACK⟨m, v, n, P⟩ and waits for an ACK. The process NAV(δ,Q ) takes care of the virtual carrier sense by updating the
NAV registerwith the delays contained in the control packets RTS/CTS. In this process, δx denotes the time required to receive
the current packet (we recall that δ() is a function). Thus, when x is instantiated with v, δx becomes δv . We recall that since
the communication is half-duplex the time required to receive a packet v is actually δv + 1.
The receiver process RCV(n, y, R) is supposed to run at node n waiting for a control packet. If a CTS packet is received
then the NAV register is updated. Otherwise, if a RTS packet is received, with destination n, the receiver replies with a CTS
packet and then waits for the data. If the data is received correctly an ACK is sent to the transmitter.
Let us write down some simple systemswhere nodes adopt the CSMA/CA protocol. The goal of these examples is to show
that the CSMA/CA protocol may fail in avoiding communication collisions in different ways. For simplicity, we assume that
the RTS/CTS packets require one time interval for their transmission.
Let us start with the following system:
Sys def= l[SND⟨l, w, n,Q ⟩]νl0
 m[SND⟨m, v, n, P⟩]νm0  n[RCV⟨n, y, R⟩]νn0
with n ∈ νl, n ∈ νm and {l,m} ⊆ νn. Here, the following execution trace
Sys
σ−−→ l!rts−−−→ m!rts−−−−→ σ−−→ σ−−→ · · · · · ·
denotes a collision at n caused by the transmission of two different RTS packets, transmitted by l and m, respectively. As a
consequence, according to the protocol, the two RTS packets will be resend in two different instants of time by using the
backoff algorithm and relying on the fact that bo(l) ≠ bo(m). The same problem would occur if the process running at l
would be σ .SND⟨l, w, n,Q ⟩, with l not in the transmission range ofm, i.e.m ∉ νl and l ∉ νm. In this case, the physical carrier
sense at l could not hear the RTS packet ofm.
Let us consider now a slightly different system:
Sys1
def= l[σ .σ .SND⟨l, w, n,Q ⟩]νl0
 m[SND⟨m, v, n, P⟩]νm0  n[RCV⟨n, y, R⟩]νn0
where {m, n} ⊆ νl, {l, n} ⊆ νm and {l,m} ⊆ νn. Here, the following execution trace
Sys1
σ−−→ m!rts−−−−→ σ−−→ σ−−→ n!cts−−−−→ l!rts−−−→ σ−−→ σ−−→ · · · · · ·
describes a collision atm caused by the simultaneous transmissions of the CTS packet of n and the RTS packet of l. Also in this
case the protocol will restart by relying on the backoff algorithm. The same problem would occur if the process running at l
would be σ .σ .σ .SND⟨l, w, n,Q ⟩, with l in the transmission range of m but not in that of n. In this case, the physical carrier
sense at lwould not help in hearing the CTS packet of n.
A different situation emerges in the following system:
Sys2
def= l[σ .σ .σ .σ .SND⟨l, w, n,Q ⟩]νl0
 m[SND⟨m, v, n, P⟩]νm0  n[RCV⟨n, y, R⟩]νn0
with again {m, n} ⊆ νl, {l, n} ⊆ νm and {l,m} ⊆ νn. Here, the following execution trace is possible:
Sys2
σ−−→ m!rts−−−−→ σ−−→ σ−−→ n!cts−−−−→ σ−−→ σ−−→ m!v−−−→ l!rts−−−→ · · · · · ·
This denotes a more serious collision at n on the transmission of data v. This collision is more problematic as it requires at
least δv+1 time units to be detected at destination. The collision is due to the fact that the node l sleeps while the RTS/CTS
packets are exchanged. Then, after four time intervals, l wakes up, senses the channel free, and starts transmitting its RTS
packet in the next time interval. Notice that if lwould have slept for a longer period then the physical carrier sense at lwould
have heard the transmission originating fromm, thus preventing the collision.
Finally, let us consider the system
Sys3
def= l[σ i.SND⟨l, w, n,Q ⟩]νl0
 m[SND⟨m, v, n, P⟩]νm0  n[RCV⟨n, y, R⟩]νn0
with 4 ≤ i ≤ δv+6 and l not in the transmission range ofm, hence n ∈ νl,m ∉ νl, n ∈ νm, l ∉ νm, and {l,m} ⊆ νn. In this case,
lmisses the RTS/CTS packets because it is sleeping. When it wakes up, it senses the channel free and it starts transmitting its
RTS by causing a collision at n on the transmission of the data v (assuming δv > 1). As an example, for i = 5, the execution
trace is:
Sys3
σ−−→ m!rts−−−−→ σ−−→ σ−−→ n!cts−−−−→ σ−−→ σ−−→ m!v−−−→ σ−−→ l!rts−−−→ · · · · · ·
6596 M. Merro et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 412 (2011) 6585–6611
Table 7
MiniSec specification.
Sender:
S ji = ⌊τ . Encrypt payload and epoch
!⟨OCB(kG, p, i)⟩.OK_SND⌋ broadcast ciphertext,
[j+ 1 = E]S0i+1, S j+1i if timeout go to next state.
Receiver:
Rji = ⌊?(x).[j+δx+1 ≥ E]P j+δx+1−Ei+1 , P j+δx+1i ⌋ Start reception
[j+1 = E]R0i+1, Rj+1i if timeout then restart.
P ji = [snd(x) = snd(OCB−1(kG, fst(x), i))] If msg comes from epoch i
!⟨authi⟩.OK_RCV , signal msg authentication
[snd(x) = snd(OCB−1(kG, fst(x), i−1))] if msg comes from epoch i−1
!⟨authi−1⟩.OK_RCV , signal msg authentication
Rji otherwise restart.
4.2. The MiniSec protocol
MiniSec [28] is a secure network layer protocol for wireless sensor networks. Basically, it improves on two well-known
sensor network link layer protocols such as TinySec [23] and ZigBee [3]. MiniSec obtains the best of both protocols by
achieving three basic goals: data secrecy, authentication and protection against replay attacks (when the attacker replay
packets at a later time).
The first two goals are obtained by using pre-deployed shared keys: a receiver can always authenticate (and thus access) a
packet using a group-key kG. More precisely, in order to achieve secrecy and authentication, MiniSec adopts Offset CodeBook
(OCB) [42], a block-cipher operation mode well-suited for sensor networks. OCB operates as follows. Let v be an arbitrary
message that needs to be encrypted and authenticated, k be the encryption key (which is the key used by the underlying
block cipher), and N be a non-repeating nonce. Then, OCB takes in v, k, and N and generates the ciphertext core C . After that,
by using the plaintext v, and the ciphertext C , OCB generates a tag. Thus, the final output of OCB(k, v,N) is the pair (C, tag).
To decrypt a ciphertext C , the receiver performs the reverse process OCB−1(k, C,N) trying to obtain the plaintext v. If the
receiver computes a pair (v′, tag ′)with tag ′ = tag then v′ = v, otherwise the ciphertext is considered to be invalid.
Protection against replay attacks is achieved by adopting a loosely time synchronisation between sender and receiver(s)
following a sliding-windows approach. The nodes of the network agree on the passage of time intervals called epochs: when
a sender builds a packet it includes as a nonce the current epoch, so that a receiver can know at which epoch the received
packet was sent. An epoch is defined as the maximum time required to complete a local broadcast. If ∆N represents the
maximum network latency and ∆T the maximum clock synchronisation error, then the length of each epoch is exactly
E = 2∆T + ∆N . By using the current epoch number as the nonce for OCB-encryption, the protocol defends against replay
attacks from older epochs. Unfortunately, because of time synchronisation errors and network latency, such a scheme
experiences many false positives at epoch transitions, as legitimate packets sent from the previous epoch will be discarded.
The solution proposed by MiniSec is to perform decryption with two possible candidate epoch values for the nonce. Thus, if
a valid packet had been sent at the beginning of an epoch, an attacker can replay that packet for at most the remainder of the
epoch as well as∆T +∆N time units of the next epoch. As a consequence, the maximumwindow of vulnerability for replay
attacks is 3∆T + 2∆N , which intuitively represents the maximum packet delay between its dispatch and its retrieval.
MiniSec has two operating modes: unicast and broadcast, henceforth known as MiniSec-U and MiniSec-B. In this article,
we focus on the latter because the unicast variant does not present particular modelling interest.
In Table 7, we provide a specification ofMiniSec in TCWSwith some simplifications.We extend the values of our calculus
with a few simple functions. In particular, OCB() and OCB−1() represent the OCB encoding and its reverse, respectively. We
split an epoch in E time intervals. The protocol contemplates a sender and a receiver process. The sender process S ji is very
simple: it builds a tuple with the payload p, the current epoch i, which acts as a nonce, and then encrypts this information
using the OCB algorithm and the group-key kG. The resulting ciphertext is broadcast. The transmission of a packet v takes
δv instants of time, with 1 ≤ δv ≤ ∆N . Moreover, message loss can affect a transmission for at most ∆T instants of time,
which represents themaximumclock synchronisation error. In process S ji the variable jdenotes the offset countingσ -actions
within an epoch. As our epochs consists of E time intervals, we have 0 ≤ j ≤ E−1. The receiver is a bit more complicated.
Upon successful reception, a receiver decrypts the information using the group-key kG, and then proceeds to verify the epoch
of the received packet. As said above, a receiver accepts packets sent during the current epoch or the previous one. This is
indirectly done by checking the tags returned by encryption and decryption. If a packet is accepted then an authentication
message is sent and the receiver process restart by updating the epoch counter and the offset.
For simplicity our specification of MiniSec considers only two nodes, to yield an easier to read model:
MiniSec def= m[S00 ]νm0 | n[R00]νn0
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where m is the sender and n is the receiver, with m ∈ νn and n ∈ νm. This does not lose any generality with respect to the
case where there are more receivers.
Let us formalise now a few properties on the behaviour of MiniSec. Let #σ (Λ) be the occurrences of σ actions in the
execution traceΛ. Let pi be an abbreviation for OCB(kG, p, i), the packet sent by the senderm at epoch i. We assume standard
Dolev-Yao assumptions for the attacker.
The next result says that only fresh packets are authenticated.
Proposition 4.1 (Packet Freshness). If node n authenticates a packet pi in epoch k then pi was sent by m either in the current
epoch k or in the previous one, i.e. i ≤ k ≤ i+ 1.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
The following proposition says that if there is a replay attack then it must occur within a vulnerability window. In fact,
if node n receives the packet pi a number of instants of time later than it was originally transmitted by m, then pi has been
replayed by the attacker. In this case, pi will be authenticated only if the attack occurred in the vulnerability window.
Proposition 4.2 (Vulnerability Window). If the protocol evolves as
MiniSec
Λ1HHH⇒ m!pi−−−−→ Λ2HHH⇒ n?pi−−−→ Λ3HHH⇒ n!authi−−−−−→
then #σ (Λ2) ≤ 2∆N + 3∆T .
Proof. See the Appendix. 
5. Observational semantics
In this section we propose a notion of timed behavioural equivalence for our wireless networks. Our starting point is
Milner and Sangiorgi’s barbed congruence [32], a standard contextually-defined programequivalence. Intuitively, two terms
are barbed congruent if they have the same observables, in all possible contexts, under all possible evolutions. The definition
of barbed congruence strongly relies on two crucial concepts: a reduction semantics to describe how a system evolves, and
a notion of observable which says what the environment can observe in a system.
From the operational semantics given in Section 2.1 it should be clear that the evolution of ourwireless networks depends
onmessage transmission and internal actionswithin nodes. Thus, we can define the reduction relation_ between networks
using the following inference rule:
(Red1)
M
m!v−−−→ N
M _ N (Red2)
M
τ−−→ N
M _ N .
We write_∗ for the reflexive and transitive closure of_.
Now, let us focus on the definition of an appropriate notion of observable. In our calculus, as in CCS [30] and inπ-calculus
[31], we have both transmission and reception ofmessages. However, in broadcast calculi only the transmission ofmessages
may be observed [40,29]. In fact, an observer cannot detect whether a given node actually receives a broadcast value. In
particular, if the node m[!⟨v⟩.P]νt evolves into m[⟨v⟩r .P]νt we do not know whether some of the neighbours have actually
synchronised for receiving the message v. On the other hand, if a non-exposed node n[⌊?(x).P⌋Q ]ν0 evolves into n[(x)v.P]νt ,
thenwe can be sure that some node in ν has started transmitting. Notice that a node n can certify the reception of amessage
v only if it receives the whole message without collisions.
Following Milner and Sangiorgi [32] we use the term ‘‘barb’’ as synonymous of observable.
Definition 5.1 (Barbs). LetM be a well-formed network. We writeM ↓n, ifM ≡ N | m[⟨v⟩r .P]νt , for somem, v, r, P, t and
ν, such that n ∈ ν and n /∈ nds(N). We writeM ⇓n if there isM ′ such thatM _∗ M ′ ↓n.
The barb M ⇓n says that there is an ongoing transmission at M reaching the node n of the environment. The observer
can easily detect such a transmission placing a receiver with timeout at n of the form n[⌊?(x).0⌋!⟨w⟩.0]νt where the system
M | n[⌊?(x).0⌋!⟨w⟩.0]νt is well-formed, and f ∈ ν, for some fresh node f . In this manner, if n is currently exposed to
a transmission then, after a σ -action, the fresh barb at f is definitely lost. One may wonder whether the barb should
mention the namem of the transmitter. Notice that, in general, due to communication collisions, the observer may receive
incomprehensible packets without being able to identify the transmitter. In fact, ifM ↓n there might be several nodes inM
which are currently transmitting to n. So, in our setting, it does not make sense to put the name of the transmitter in the
barb.
Now, everything is in place to define our timed notion of barbed congruence. In the sequel, we writeR to denote binary
relations over well-formed networks.
Definition 5.2 (Barb Preserving). A relationR is said to be barb preserving if whenever M R N it holds that M ↓n implies
N ⇓n.
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Definition 5.3 (Reduction Closure). A relationR is said to be reduction-closed ifM R N andM _ M ′ imply there is N ′ such
that N _∗ N ′ andM ′ R N ′.
As we are interested in weak behavioural equivalences, the definition of reduction closure is given in terms of weak
reductions.
Definition 5.4 (σ -Closure). A relationR is said to be σ -closed if M R N and M
σ−−→ M ′ imply there is a network N ′ such
that N _∗ σ−−→_∗ N ′ andM ′ R N ′.
When comparing two networksM and N , time must pass in the same manner forM and N .
Definition 5.5 (Contextuality). A relationR is said contextual if M R N , for M and N well-formed, implies M | O R N | O
for all networks O such thatM | O and N | O are well-formed.
Finally, everything is in place to define timed reduction barbed congruence.
Definition 5.6 (Timed Reduction Barbed Congruence). Timed reduction barbed congruence, written∼=, is the largest symmet-
ric relation over well-formed networks which is barb preserving, reduction-closed, σ -closed and contextual.
6. A bisimulation proof method
The definition of timed reduction barbed congruence is simple and intuitive. However, due to the universal quantification
on parallel contexts, it may be quite difficult to prove that two terms are barbed congruent. Simpler proof techniques are
based on labelled bisimilarities. In this section, we propose an appropriate notion of bisimulation between networks. As a
main result, we prove that our labelled bisimilarity is a proof-technique for timed reduction barbed congruence.
First of all we have to distinguish between transmissions which may be observed and transmissions which may not be
observed by the environment. Thus, we extend the set of labelled transitions with the following two rules:
(Shh)
M
m!v−−−→ N ngh(m,M)⊆nds(M)
M
τ−−→ N
(Out)
M
m!v−−−→ N ν:=ngh(m,M)\nds(M)≠∅
M
!v◃ν−−−−→ N
.
Rule (Shh)models transmissions that cannot be detected by the environment. This happens if none of the potential receivers
is in the environment. Rule (Out) models a transmission of a message that may be potentially received by the nodes ν of
the environment. Notice that this transmission can be really observed at some node n ∈ ν only if no collisions arise at n
during the transmission of v. In rule (Out) the name of the transmitter is removed from the action. This is motivated by the
fact that nodes may refuse to reveal their identities, e.g., for security reasons, or limited sensory capabilities in perceiving
these identities. Actually, in a hostile scenario the identity of the transmitter can only be ensured by using appropriate
authentication protocols.
In the sequel, we use themetavariable α to range over the following actions: τ , σ ,m?v and !v◃ν. Since we are interested
in weak behavioural equivalences, that abstract over τ -actions, we introduce a standard notion of weak action: H⇒ denotes
the reflexive and transitive closure of
τ−−→; αHH⇒ denotes H⇒ α−−→H⇒; αˆHH⇒ denotes H⇒ if α = τ and αHH⇒ otherwise.
Definition 6.1 (Bisimilarity). A relation R over well-formed networks is a simulation if M R N implies that whenever
M
α−−→ M ′ there is N ′ such that N αˆHH⇒ N ′ and M ′ R N ′. A relation R is called bisimulation if both R and its converse are
simulations. We say thatM and N are bisimilar, writtenM ≈ N , if there is some bisimulationR such thatM R N .
It is worth noticing that whenever two networks are bisimilar then they must have the same set of nodes.
Proposition 6.2. If M ≈ N then nds(M) = nds(M).
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose there is a node m such that m ∈ nds(M) and m ∉ nds(N). Then, by Proposition 2.4(1)
(implication left to right) there is N ′ such that N
m?v−−−→ N ′. Since M ≈ N there must be M ′ such that M m?vHHH⇒ M ′ with
M ′ ≈ N ′. However, since m ∈ nds(M), by Proposition 2.4(1) (implication right to left) there is no way to deduce a weak
transition of the formM m?vHHH⇒ M ′, as a nodem[W ]νt cannot perform an actionm?v. 
In order to prove that our labelled bisimilarity implies timed reduction barbed congruence we have to show its
contextuality.
Theorem 6.3 (≈ is Contextual). Let M and N be two well-formed networks such that M ≈ N. Then M | O ≈ N | O for all
networks O such that M | O and N | O are well-formed.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Theorem 6.4 (Soundness). Let M and N be two well-formed networks such that M ≈ N. Then M ∼= N.
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Proof. Wehave to prove that the labelled bisimilarity is contextual, barb preserving, reduction- and σ -closed. Contextuality
follows from Theorem6.3. Reduction and σ -closure follow by definition. As to barb preservationwe reason by contradiction,
ifM ↓n we can choose O def= n[⌊?(x).0⌋!⟨w⟩.0]νt such thatM | O and N | O are well-formed, and f ∈ ν, for some fresh name
f . SinceM ↓n the networkM | Owill never (even in the future) perform an output action !w◃ν. On the other hand, if N ⇓̸n
by Theorem 3.3 we would have N | O _∗ σ−−→ N ′, for some network N ′. This implies N | O _∗ σ−−→_∗ !w◃ν−−−−→. However, by
Theorem 6.3 it follows thatM | O ≈ N | O. So, it must be N ⇓n. 
In Theorem6.5, we report a number of algebraic laws onwell-formed networks that can be proved using our bisimulation
proof-technique. The first and the second law show different but equivalent nodes that do not interact with the rest of
the network. The third law is about exposed sleeping nodes. The fourth law is about successful reception. Here, node n
will receive correctly because all its neighbours will not interfere during the current transmission. The fifth and the sixth
law are about collisions: in both cases the transmission at m will cause a collision at n. The seventh law tells about the
blindness of receivers exposed to collisions. In particular, if all neighbours of a transmitter are exposed, then the content
of the transmission is irrelevant as all recipients will fail. Only the duration of the transmission may be important as the
exposure indicators of the neighbours may change.
Theorem 6.5. All networks below are assumed to be well-formed.
1. n[nil]νt ≈ n[Sleep]νt , where Sleep def= σ .Sleep.
2. n[nil]νt ≈ n[P]νt , if P does not contain sender processes.
3. n[σ r .P]νs ≈ n[σ r .P]νt if s ≤ r and t ≤ r.
4. m[⟨v⟩r .P]νt | n[(x)v.Q ]ν
′
r | M ≈ m[⟨v⟩r .P]νt | n[σ r .{v/x}Q ]ν
′
r | M, if m ∈ ν ′ ⊆ nds(M) and whenever M AHH⇒
!w◃µ−−−−→, with
n ∈ µ, then #σ (A) ≥ r+1.
5. m[!⟨v⟩.P]νs | n[(x)w.Q ]ν
′
t ≈ m[!⟨v⟩.P]νs | n[(x)⊥.Q ]ν
′
t , if m ∈ ν ′.
6. m[⟨v1⟩r .!⟨v2⟩.P]νs | n[(x)w.Q ]ν
′
t ≈ m[⟨v1⟩r .!⟨v2⟩.P]νs | n[(x)⊥.Q ]ν
′
t , if m ∈ ν ′.
7. m[!⟨v⟩.P]νt | N ≈ m[!⟨w⟩.P]νt | N, if δv = δw , and for all n ∈ ν it holds that N ≡ n[W ]ν
′
t ′ | N ′, with t ′ > 0.
Proof. By exhibiting the appropriate bisimulations. Let us prove, for instance, Laws 5 and 7. Let us start with Law 5. For
convenience, let us define:
• A def= m[!⟨v⟩.P]νs | n[(x)w.Q ]ν
′
t
• B def= m[!⟨v⟩.P]νs | n[(x)⊥.Q ]ν
′
t .
Let
S
def= {(A, B) | for all s and t} ∪ Id
where Id is the identity relation over network terms. We prove that S is a bisimulation up to≡. We proceed by case analysis
on the possible transitions of A. Notice that by maximal progress, no σ -actions may be performed.
• If A h?v
′
−−−→ A′. The most interesting case is when h ∈ ν ∩ ν ′. In this case, by an application of rules (Coll), (Exp) and (RcvPar)
we have A′ = m[!⟨v⟩.P]νs′ | n[(x)⊥.Q ]ν
′
t ′ , where t
′ = max(t, δv′) and s′ = max(s, δv′). Similarly, we have B h?v
′
−−−→ A′ and
we are done.
• If A !v◃νˆ−−−−→ A′, with νˆ = ν \ {n} ≠ ∅, then since m ∈ ν ′, by an application of rules (Snd), (Coll), (Sync) and (Out) it follows
that A′ = m[⟨v⟩δv .P]νs | n[(x)⊥.Q ]ν
′
t ′ with t
′ = max(t, δv). Similarly, we have B !v◃νˆ−−−−→ A′ and we are done.
• If A τ−−→ A′, because A m!v−−−→ A′ and ν = {n}. This case is similar to the previous one.
As regards the proof of Law 7, let us define:
• A1 def= m[!⟨v⟩.P]νt | N , where for all n ∈ ν it holds that N ≡ n[W ]ν
′
t ′ | N ′, with t ′ > 0
• B1 def= m[!⟨w⟩.P]νt | N , where for all n ∈ ν it holds that N ≡ n[W ]ν
′
t ′ | N ′, with t ′ > 0
• A2 def= m[⟨v⟩r .P]νt | N , with r ≤ δv , where for all n ∈ ν it holds that N ≡ n[W ]ν
′
t ′ | N ′, with t ′ ≥ r
• B2 def= m[⟨v⟩r .P]νt | N , with r ≤ δw , where for all n ∈ ν it holds that N ≡ n[W ]ν
′
t ′ | N ′, with t ′ ≥ r
where δv = δw . Now, let
S
def= {(A1, B1) : for all P, t, ν, . . .} ∪ {(A2, B2) : for all P, t, ν, . . .)} ∪ Id
where Id is the identity relation between network terms. We prove that S is a bisimulation. We proceed by case analysis on
the possible transitions.
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• Let us examine the most interesting transitions of A1. The reasoning for the other transitions of A1 is simpler. Notice that
by maximal progress the term A1 cannot perform σ -actions.
– Let A1
τ−−→ A2 = m[⟨v⟩δv .P]νt | Nˆ , because A1
m!v−−−→ A2 by an application of rule (Shh). This is possible only by an
application of rule (Sync)with
∗ m[!⟨v⟩.P]νt
m!v−−−→ m[⟨v⟩δv .P]νt
∗ N m?v−−−→ Nˆ , where if n ∈ ν then Nˆ ≡ n[Wˆ ]ν′tˆ | Nˆ ′, with tˆ ≥ δv (by definition of rules (Coll) and (Exp)).
Notice that since all nodes in ν ∩ nds(N) are exposed, it follows that if Wˆ is an active receiver then it will be of the
form (x)⊥.P , for some P . Now, A2
τ−−→ B2 = m[⟨w⟩δw .P]νt | ˆˆN , because A2
m!v−−−→ B2 by an application of rule (Shh).
This is possible only by an application of rule (Sync)with
∗ m[!⟨w⟩.P]νt
m!w−−−−→ m[⟨w⟩δw .P]νt
∗ N m?w−−−−→ ˆˆN , where if n ∈ ν then ˆˆN ≡ n[ ˆˆW ]ν′ˆˆt |
ˆˆN
′
, with ˆˆt ≥ δv (by definition of rules (Coll) and (Exp)).
Again, since all nodes in ν ∩ nds(N) are exposed, it follows that if ˆˆW is an active receiver then it will be of the form
(x)⊥.P , for some P . Moreover, since δv = δw it follows tˆ = ˆˆt . As a consequence, Nˆ = ˆˆN and (A2, B2) ∈ S.
• Let us examine the most interesting transitions of A2. The reasoning for the other transitions is simpler.
– Let A2
σ−−→ A′2 = m[⟨v⟩r−1.P]νt−1 | Nˆ by an application of rule (Par-σ ) because
∗ m[⟨v⟩r .P]νt
σ−−→ m[⟨v⟩r−1.P]νt−1
∗ N σ−−→ Nˆ .
In this case we have B2
σ−−→ B′2 = m[⟨w⟩r−1.P]νt−1 | Nˆ . Now, independent of whether r > 1 or not we have
(A′2, B
′
2) ∈ S. 
7. Conclusions, future and related work
We have proposed a broadcasting timed process calculus for wireless networks with time-consuming transmissions. We
have equipped our calculus with a formal operational semantics which has been used to formally analyse communication
collisions. We have used an extended version of TCWS to describe a number of protocols at different levels of abstraction.
Then, we have developed a bisimulation-based semantic theory which has been used to prove a number of algebraic laws.
In TCWS we have modelled wireless networks with a unique channel. However, new techniques have been developed
in the last years to provide several virtual channels. The most known techniques are Frequency Division Multiplexing (FDM),
which involves assigning non-overlapping frequency ranges to different signals, and Time Division Multiplexing (TDM), in
which the time domain is divided into several recurrent time slots of fixed length, one for each sub-channel.
Frequency Division Multiplexing, where a channel is divided into several non-interfering sub-channels, can be easily
implemented in a generalisation of TCWS with multiple channels (à la CCS).
Time Division Multiplexing can be represented in TCWS as well. For instance, Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) is a
type of Time Division Multiplexing, where instead of having one transmitter connected to one receiver, there are multiple
transmitters. TDMA is used in the digital 2G cellular systems such as Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM). TDMA
allows several users to share the same frequency channel by dividing the signal into different time slots. The users transmit
in rapid succession, one after the other, each using his own time slot. This allows multiple stations to share the same
transmission medium (e.g. radio frequency channel) while using only a part of its channel capacity. TDMA is easy to model
in our TCWS calculus. To have an idea let us consider a simple system in which the channel is divided in two sub-channels
taking∆ time units each:
Sys def= m1[P]νm10
 n1[R]νn10  m2[σ∆.P]νm20  n2[σ∆.R]νm10
where P def= · · · .σ∆.P and R def= · · · .σ∆.R are two synchronised processes. Intuitively, the pair of nodesm1 and n1 use the
channel in odd time slots, whilem2 and n2 use the channel in even time slots.
In TCWS we have assumed that all nodes have the same transmission range; this is a quite common assumption in
models for ad hoc networks [33] and actually it is required in someMAC-layer protocols such as CSMA/CA (see Section 4.1.1
for details).
As in Lanese and Sangiorgi’s CWS [25], our calculus does not deal with node mobility, i.e. nodes are assumed to be
immobile. This is mainly for two reasons. First, as noticed in [25] node mobility is an orthogonal issue, which does not
affect the formulation of our semantics and the treatment of interference (the main topic of this paper). Second, movement
is not relevant in important classes of wireless systems, most notably sensor networks [2] (not all sensor networks are
stationary, but the stationary case is predominant). Nevertheless, it is possible to adopt in our calculus some techniques
developed in [14,15] to allowdisciplined forms ofmobility,where neighbouring relationsmay changeprovided that network
connectivity is maintained.
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In Section 4.1, we have seen that the CSMA scheme (even in its p-persistent form) suffers of several problems such as
the exposed terminal problem and the hidden terminal problem. Clearly, in a broadcast environment where there is no
direct way to infer the loss of information owing to collisions, it is important to indirectly and accurately determine the
probability of packet collisions. We believe that our calculus represents a solid basis to develop a probabilistic calculus
where transmitters start transmitting with a certain probability p (independently whether the channel is free) and with
probability 1−pwaits before transmitting. The goal would be that of developing verification techniques such as probabilistic
model checking [24] to guarantee the absence of collisions with a certain probability. This will be one of the directions of our
research.
Last but not least, we believe that our timed calculus can be used as a basis to develop trust models for wireless systems.
Trust establishment in ad hoc networks is an open and challenging field. In fact, without a centralised trusted authority it is
not obvious how to build andmaintain trust. Nevertheless, the notion of time seems to be important to represent credentials’
expiration.
Let us examine now the most relevant related works.
We start with the literature on process calculi for wireless systems. Nanz and Hankin [36] have introduced a calculus for
MobileWireless Networks (CBS♯), relying on graph representation of node localities. Themain goal of the paper is to present
a framework for specification and security analysis of communication protocols formobilewireless networks.Merro [29] has
proposed a process calculus for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks with a labelled characterisation of reduction barbed congruence.
Godskesen [16] has proposed a calculus formobile adhocnetworks (CMAN). Thepaper proves a characterisation of reduction
barbed congruence in terms of a contextual bisimulation. It also contains a formalisation of an attack on the cryptographic
routing protocol ARAN. Singh, Ramakrishnan and Smolka [44] have proposed theω-calculus, a conservative extension of the
π-calculus. A key feature of the ω-calculus is the separation of a node’s communication and computational behaviour from
the description of its physical transmission range. The authors provide a labelled transition semantics and a bisimulation
in ‘‘open’’ style. The ω-calculus is then used for modelling the AODV routing protocol. Ghassemi et al. [14] have proposed
a process algebra for mobile ad hoc networks (RBPT) where, topology changes are implicitly modelled in the (operational)
semantics rather than in the syntax. The authors propose a notion of bisimulation for networks parameterised on a set of
topology invariants that must be respected by equivalent networks. This work in then refined in [15] where the authors
propose an equational theory for an extension of RBPT. All the previous calculi abstract from the presence of interferences.
Lanese and Sangiorgi [25] have instead proposed the CWS calculus, a lower level untimed calculus to describe interferences
in wireless systems. In their LTS there is a separation between transmission beginning and transmission ending. Our work
is definitely inspired by [25]. More recently, Godskesen and Nanz [18] have proposed a simple timed calculus for wireless
systems to express a wide range of mobility models.
None of the calculi mentioned above, except for [18], deals with time, although there is an extensive literature on timed
process algebra. From a purely syntactic point of view, the earliest proposals are extensions of the three main process
algebras, ACP, CSP and CCS. For example, [4] presents a real-time extension of ACP, [41] contains a denotational model
for a timed extension of CSP, while CCS is the starting point for [35]. In [4,41] time is real-valued, and at least semantically,
associated directly with actions. The other major approach to representing time is to introduce special actions to model the
passage of time, which the current paper shares with [19,7,35,37,47,48], although the basis for all those proposals may be
found in [9]. The current paper shares many of the assumptions of the languages presented in these papers. For example, all
the papers above assume that actions are instantaneous and only the extension of ACP presented in [19] does not incorporate
time determinism; however maximal progress is less popular and patience is even rarer.
More recent works on timed process algebra include the following papers. Aceto and Hennessy [1] have presented a
simple process algebra where time emerges in the definition of a timed observational equivalence, assuming that beginning
and termination of actions are distinct events which can be observed. Hennessy and Regan [20] have proposed a timed
version of CCS enjoying time determinism, maximal progress and patience. Our action σ takes inspiration from theirs. The
authors have developed a semantic theory based on testing and characterised in terms of a particular kind of ready traces.
Prasad [39] has proposed a timed variant of his CBS [38], called TCBS. In TCBS a time out can force a process wishing to
speak to remain idle for a specific interval of time; this corresponds to have a priority. TCBS also assumes time determinism
and maximal progress. Corradini et al. [11] deal with durational actions proposing a framework relying on the notions of
reduction and observability to naturally incorporate timing information in terms of process interaction. Our definition
of timed reduction barbed congruence takes inspiration from theirs. Corradini and Pistore [12] have studied durational
actions to describe and reason about the performance of systems. Actions have lower and upper time bounds, specifying
their possible different durations. Their time equivalence refines the untimed one. Baeten andMiddelburg [5] have proposed
several timed process algebras treated in a common framework, and related by embeddings and conservative extensions
relations. These process algebras, ACPsat, ACPsrt, ACPdat and ACPdrt, allow the execution of two or more actions consecutively
at the same point in time, separate the execution of actions from the passage of time, and consider actions to have no
duration. The process algebra ACPsat is a real-time process algebra with absolute time, ACPsrt is a real-time process algebra
with relative time. Similarly, ACPdat and ACPdrt are discrete-time process algebras with absolute time and relative time,
respectively. In these process algebra the focus is on unsuccessful termination or deadlock. In [6] Baeten and Reniers extend
the framework of [5] to model successful termination for the relative-time case. Laneve and Zavattaro [26] have proposed
a timed extension of π-calculus where time proceeds asynchronously at the network level, while it is constrained by the
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local urgency at the process level. They propose a timed bisimilarity whose discriminating is weaker when local urgency is
dropped.
Acknowledgements
The referees have provided many useful suggestions. We thank Sebastian Nanz for a preliminary discussion on timed
calculi for wireless networks and Davide Quaglia for insightful discussions on the IEEE 802.11 standard. Many thanks are
due to Matthew Hennessy for his precious comments on an early draft of the paper. We thank Andrea Cerone for suggesting
us to use receivers with timeout to model the CSMA protocol.
Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.4. Let us prove the single items of the proposition.
1. Let us prove first the implication from left to right. If m ∉ nds(M) then M m?v−−−→ M ′, for some network M ′.
Let us proceed by induction on the structure ofM .
• LetM = 0. By an application of rule (Zero)we haveM m?v−−−→ M .
• LetM = n[W ]νt . Let us proceed by induction on the structure ofW .
– LetW = nil. There are two cases.
∗ Ifm ∉ ν then by an application of rule (OutRng)we haveM m?v−−−→ M .
∗ Ifm ∈ ν then by an application of rule (Exp)we haveM m?v−−−→ M ′ withM ′ = n[nil]νt ′ , where t ′ = max(t, δv).
– LetW = !⟨v⟩.P . This case is similar to the previous one.
– W = σ .P . This case is similar to the previous one.
– W = ⟨v⟩r .P . This case is similar to the previous one.
– LetW = ⌊τ .P⌋Q . This case is similar to the previous one.
– LetW = ⌊?(x).P⌋Q . There are three sub-cases.
∗ Ifm ∉ ν then by an application of rule (OutRng)we haveM m?v−−−→ M .
∗ Ifm ∈ ν and t = 0 then there are two possibilities:
· by an application of rule (Rcv)we can deriveM m?v−−−→ M ′, withM ′ = n[(x)v.P]νδv ;
· by an application of rule (Exp)we can deriveM m?v−−−→ M ′, withM ′ = n[⌊?(x).P⌋Q ]νδv .
∗ If m ∈ ν and t > 0 then by an application of rule (Exp) we have M m?v−−−→ M ′, with M ′ = n[⌊?(x).P⌋Q ]νt ′ and
t ′ = max(t, δv).
– LetW = (x)w.P . There are two sub-cases.
∗ Ifm ∈ ν then by an application of rule (Coll), it holds thatM m?v−−−→ M ′ = n[(x)⊥.P]νt ′ with t ′ := max(t,δv).
∗ Ifm /∈ ν then by an application of rule (OutRng)we haveM m?v−−−→ M .
– Let W = [v = v]P1, P2. By an application of rule (Then) we can apply the inductive hypothesis to conclude that the
statement holds.
– LetW = [v1 = v2]P1, P2, with v1 ≠ v2. By an application of rule (Else), this case is similar to the previous one.
– Let W = H⟨v˜⟩. The constraint on guarded recursion ensures us that by an application of rule (Rec) we can apply the
inductive hypothesis to conclude that the statement holds.
• Let M = M1 | M2. By inductive hypothesis it holds that M1 m?v−−−→ M ′1 and M2
m?v−−−→ M ′2, for some M ′1,M ′2. By an
application of rule (RcvPar) it holds thatM
m?v−−−→ M ′, forM ′ = M ′1 | M ′2.
The implication from right to left says the following: if M
m?v−−−→ M ′ for some M ′, then m ∉ nds(M). The proof is by
straightforward rule induction.
2. Let us consider first the implication from left to right. If M1 | M2 m?v−−−→ N then there are N1 and N2 such that M1 m?v−−−→ N1,
M2
m?v−−−→ N2 and N = N1 | N2. Here, the proof follows by noticing that the only rule for deriving the action m?v from
M1 | M2 is (RcvPar). In its premises this rule requires exactly that the two parallel componentsM1 andM2 must perform an
actionm?v. The other implication is an easy application of rule (RcvPar).
3. IfM
m!v−−−→ M ′ thenM ≡ m[!⟨v⟩.P]νt | N , for some ν, t , P and N , and there is N ′ such thatm[!⟨v⟩.P]νt
m!v−−−→ m[⟨v⟩δv .P]νt ,
N
m?v−−−→ N ′ andM ′ ≡ m[⟨v⟩δv .P]νt | N ′. The proof of this result follows by a straightforward induction on whyM
m!v−−−→ M ′.
4. If M
τ−−→ M ′ then M ≡ m[⌊τ .P⌋Q ]νt | N , for some m, ν, t , P , Q and N such that m[⌊τ .P⌋Q ]νt
τ−−→ m[P]νt and
M ′ ≡ m[P]νt | N . Again, the proof is by a straightforward transition induction.
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5. Let us consider first the implication from left to right. If M1 | M2 σ−−→ N then there are N1 and N2 such that M1 σ−−→ N1,
M2
σ−−→ N2 and N = N1 | N2. Here, the proof follows by noticing that the only rule for deriving the action σ from M1 | M2
is (σ -Par). In its premises this rule requires exactly that the two parallel componentsM1 andM2 must perform an action σ .
The other implication is an easy application of rule (σ -Par). 
Now, we prove that our operational semantics preserves network well-formedness.
Proposition A.1. Let M be a node-unique network. If M
λ−−→ M ′ then M ′ is node-unique.
Proof. By transition induction. 
Proposition A.2. Let M be a connected network. If M
λ−−→ M ′ then M ′ is connected.
Proof. By transition induction. Notice that no inference rule changes the network topology. 
Next, we prove that our labelled transition semantics preserves exposure consistency. For thatwe need the two following
technical lemmas.
Lemma A.3. Let M
λ−−→ M ′, λ ∈ {m!v,m?v} such that M ≡∏i∈ ni[Wi]νiti and M ′ ≡∏i∈I ni[W ′i ]νit ′i .
1. If λ = m?v then m ≠ ni, for all i.
2. If λ = m!v then there is i ∈ I such that m = ni, Wi = !⟨v⟩.Pi and W ′i = ⟨v⟩δv .Pi.
3. If m ∉ νi, for some i, then t ′i = ti; if also m ≠ ni, then W ′i = Wi.
4. If m ∈ νi, for some i, then t ′i = max(ti, δv).
5. If m ∈ νi and W ′i=(x)w.Pi, for some i, andw≠⊥, thenw = v, ti = 0, t ′i = δv , and Wi is not an active sender process,
6. If Wi = ⟨w⟩r .Pi, for some i, then W ′i = Wi.
7. If m ≠ ni and W ′i = ⟨w⟩r .Pi, for some i, then W ′i = Wi.
Proof. By transition induction. 
Lemma A.4. Let M
σ−−→ M ′ such that M ≡∏i∈ ni[Wi]νiti and M ′ ≡∏i∈I ni[W ′i ]νit ′i .
1. For all i, t ′i = ti − 1, if ti > 0 and 0 otherwise.
2. If W ′i = (x)v.P, for some i, then• either Wi = W ′i• or Wi is not an active receiver and v = ⊥
3. If W ′i = ⟨w⟩r .P, for some i, then Wi = ⟨w⟩r+1.P.
Proof. By transition induction. 
Now, we can prove the preservation of exposure consistency.
Proposition A.5 (Exposure Consistency). Let M be an exposure consistent network. If M
λ−−→ M ′ then M ′ is exposure consistent.
Proof. The proof proceeds by transition induction on the derivation ofM
λ−−→ M ′, for λ ∈ {m!v,m?v, σ , τ }. We show the
most significant cases, derived by an application of rules (Sync), (RcvPar) and (σ -Par). The other cases are straightforward.
• LetM m!v−−−→ M ′ by an application of rule (Sync)withM = M1 | M2,M1 m!v−−−→ M ′1 andM2
m?v−−−→ M ′2, andM ′ = M ′1 | M ′2,
where M ′1 and M
′
2 are exposure consistent by inductive hypothesis. We have to prove that M
′ respects the clauses of
Definition 2.7.
– Clauses 1–2. In these cases the result follows directly by inductive hypothesis.
– Clause 3. Let M ′ ≡ ∏i ni[W ′i ]νit ′i | h[⟨v⟩r .P]νht ′h | n[W ′]νnt ′n , with h ∈ νn. We have to prove that r ≤ t ′n. We only consider
the case when h ∈ nds(M1) and n ∈ nds(M2) (or vice versa). The other cases are easier. There are two possibilities.
∗ h ≠ m. By Lemma A.3(7) we have
M ≡
∏
i
ni[Wi]νiti | h[⟨v⟩r .P]νhth | n[W ]νntn
for appropriate processes and tags. Now, if m ∈ νn by Lemma A.3(4) we have t ′n = max(tn, δv). As M is exposure
consistent it holds that r ≤ tn and hence also r ≤ t ′n. On the other hand, ifm ∉ νn by an application of LemmaA.3(3)
we have t ′n = tn. AsM is exposure consistent it follows that r ≤ tn = t ′n.∗ h = m. By Lemma A.3(2) it follows that
M ≡
∏
i
ni[Wi]νiti | h[!⟨v⟩.P]νhth | n[W ]νntn
for appropriate processes and tags, with r = δv . Since h ∈ νn, by Lemma A.3(4) we have t ′n = max(tn, δv). As a
consequence, r ≤ t ′n.
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– Clause 4. Let
M ≡ N | n[W ]νt =
∏
i
ni[Wi]νiti | n[W ]νt
and
M ′ ≡ N ′ | n[W ′]νt ′ =
∏
i
ni[W ′i ]νit ′i | n[W
′]νt ′
with t ′ > 0 and active(k′,N ′) ≠ t ′ for all k′ ∈ ν ∩ actsnd(N ′). We have to prove that there is kˆ ∈ ν \ nds(N ′) such
that if kˆ ∈ νi, for some i, then t ′i ≥ t ′. We can distinguish two cases:∗ If m ∉ ν by Lemma A.3(3) we have t ′ = t . By Lemma A.3(6), it follows that actsnd(N) ⊆ actsnd(N ′). As a
consequence, ν ∩ actsnd(N) ⊆ ν ∩ actsnd(N ′). Since t ′ = t we can derive that for all k ∈ ν ∩ actsnd(N) it
holds that active(k,N ′) ≠ t . By Lemma A.3(6) and Lemma A.3(7) if k ≠ m then active(k,N) = active(k,N ′). Since
m ∉ ν it follows that for all k ∈ ν ∩ actsnd(N) it holds active(k,N) ≠ t . SinceM is exposure consistent it follows
that there is kˆ ∈ ν \ nds(N) such that if kˆ ∈ νi, for some i, then ti ≥ t . Notice that ν \ nds(N) = ν \ nds(N ′).
Moreover, by Lemmas A.3(3) and A.3(4)we have ti ≤ t ′i , for all i. This allows us to derive that there is kˆ ∈ ν\nds(N ′)
such that if kˆ ∈ νi, for some i, then t ′i ≥ ti ≥ t = t ′.∗ If m ∈ ν then by Lemma A.3(4) we have t ′ = max(t, δv). By definition of neighbouring of a node m ∈ ν
implies m ≠ n. By Lemma A.3(2) it follows that m ∉ actsnd(N), m ∈ actsnd(N ′), and active(m,N ′) = δv .
Since active(k′,N ′) ≠ t ′ for all k′ ∈ ν ∩ actsnd(N ′), and m ∈ ν ∩ actsnd(N ′), it follows that t ′ ≠ δv .
Since t ′ = max(t, δv), it follows that t ′ = t . By Lemma A.3(6), it follows that actsnd(N) ⊆ actsnd(N ′). As a
consequence, ν ∩ actsnd(N) ⊆ ν ∩ actsnd(N ′). Since t ′ = t we can derive that for all k ∈ ν ∩ actsnd(N) it
holds that active(k,N ′) ≠ t . By Lemma A.3(6) and Lemma A.3(7) if k ≠ m then active(k,N) = active(k,N ′). Since
m ∉ actsnd(N) it follows that for all k ∈ ν ∩ actsnd(N) it holds active(k,N) ≠ t . SinceM is exposure consistent it
follows that there is kˆ ∈ ν \nds(N) such that if kˆ ∈ νi, for some i, then ti ≥ t . Notice that ν \nds(N) = ν \nds(N ′).
Moreover, by Lemma A.3(3) and A.3(4) we have ti ≤ t ′i , for all i. This allows us to derive that there is kˆ ∈ ν \nds(N ′)
such that if kˆ ∈ νi, for some i, then t ′i ≥ ti ≥ t = t ′.
• Let M m?v−−−→ M ′ by an application of rule (RcvPar) with M = M1 | M2, M1 m?v−−−→ M ′1, M2
m?v−−−→ M ′2, and M ′ = M ′1 | M ′2,
where both M ′1 and M
′
2 are exposure consistent by inductive hypothesis. We have to prove that M
′ respects the clauses
of Definition 2.7.
– Clauses 1–2. We reason as in the case of the sending actionm!v examined above.
– Clause 3. Let M ′ ≡ ∏i ni[W ′i ]νit ′i | h[⟨v⟩r .P]νht ′h | n[W ′]νnt ′n , with h ∈ νn. We have to prove that r ≤ t ′n. We only consider
the case when h ∈ nds(M1) and n ∈ nds(M2) (or vice versa). The other cases are easier. By Lemma A.3(1) it holds that
m ∉ nds(M ′). By A.3(7) it follows:
M ≡
∏
i
ni[Wi]νiti | h[⟨v⟩r .P]νhth | n[W ]νntn
for appropriate processes and tags. Now, if m ∈ νn by Lemma A.3(4) we have t ′n = max(tn, δv). As M is exposure
consistent it holds that r ≤ tn and hence also r ≤ t ′n. On the other hand, ifm ∉ νn by an application of Lemma A.3(3)
we have t ′n = tn; asM is exposure consistent it follows that r ≤ tn = t ′n.
– Clause 4. Let
M ≡ N | n[W ]νt =
∏
i
ni[Wi]νiti | n[W ]νt
and
M ′ ≡ N ′ | n[W ′]νt ′ =
∏
i
ni[W ′i ]νit ′i | n[W
′]νt ′
with t ′ > 0 and active(k′,N ′) ≠ t ′ for all k′ ∈ ν ∩ actsnd(N ′). We have to prove that there is kˆ ∈ ν \ nds(N ′) such
that if kˆ ∈ νi, for some i, then t ′i ≥ t ′. There are two cases.∗ Let m ∉ ν. By Lemma A.3(3) we have t ′ = t . By Lemma A.3(6), it follows that actsnd(N) ⊆ actsnd(N ′). As a
consequence, ν ∩ actsnd(N) ⊆ ν ∩ actsnd(N ′). Since t ′ = t we can derive that for all k ∈ ν ∩ actsnd(N) it holds
that active(k,N ′) ≠ t . By Lemma A.3(6) and Lemma A.3(7) if k ≠ m then active(k,N) = active(k,N ′). Sincem ∉ ν
it follows that for all k ∈ ν ∩ actsnd(N) it holds active(k,N) ≠ t . Since M is exposure consistent it follows that
there is kˆ ∈ ν \ nds(N) such that if kˆ ∈ νi, for some i, then ti ≥ t . Notice that ν \ nds(N) = ν \ nds(N ′). Moreover,
by Lemma A.3(3) and A.3(4) we have ti ≤ t ′i , for all i. This allows us to derive that there is kˆ ∈ ν \nds(N ′) such that
if kˆ ∈ νi, for some i, then t ′i ≥ ti ≥ t = t ′.∗ Let m ∈ ν. By Lemma A.3(1) we have m ∉ nds(M). By Lemmas A.3(6) and A.3(7) for all k ∈ nds(N) it holds
that active(k,N) = active(K ,N ′). As a consequence, actsnd(N) = actsnd(N ′), and hence ν ∩ actsnd(N) =
ν ∩ actsnd(N ′). By Lemma A.3(4) we have t ′ = max(t, δv). So, there are two cases.· Let δv ≤ t . Then t ′ = t and for all k ∈ ν ∩ actsnd(N) it holds active(k,N) ≠ t . Since M is exposure
consistent it follows that there is kˆ ∈ ν \ nds(N) such that if kˆ ∈ νi, for some i, then ti ≥ t . Notice that
ν \ nds(N) = ν \ nds(N ′). Moreover, by Lemmas A.3(3) and A.3(4) we have ti ≤ t ′i , for all i. This allows us to
derive that there is kˆ ∈ ν \ nds(N ′) such that if kˆ ∈ νi, for some i, then t ′i ≥ ti ≥ t = t ′.
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· Let δv > t . Then t ′ = δv . In this case, there is m ∈ ν \ nds(N ′) such that if m ∈ νi, for some i, then by
Lemma A.3(4) it holds that t ′i = max(ti, δv). Thus, t ′i ≥ δv = t ′.
• Let M σ−−→ M ′ by an application of rule (σ -Par) with M = M1 | M2, M1 σ−−→ M ′1 and M2
σ−−→ M ′2, and M ′ = M ′1 | M ′2,
where both M ′1 and M
′
2 are exposure consistent by inductive hypothesis. We have to prove that M
′ respects the clauses
of Definition 2.7.
– Clauses 1–2. It is easy to show thatM ′ is exposure consistent. The results follow by inductive hypothesis.
– Clause 3. Let
M ′ ≡
∏
i
ni[W ′i ]νit ′i | h[⟨v⟩
r .P]νht ′h | n[W
′]νnt ′n
with h ∈ νn. We have to prove that r ≤ t ′n. We only consider the case when h ∈ nds(M1) and n ∈ nds(M2) (or vice
versa). The other cases are easier. By Lemma A.4(1) and A.4(3) we have
M ≡
∏
i
ni[Wi]νiti | h[⟨v⟩r+1.P]νhth | n[W ]νnt ′n+1
for appropriate processes and tags. AsM is exposure consistent, it follows that r ≤ t ′n.
– Clause 4. Let
M ≡ N | n[W ]νt =
∏
i
ni[Wi]νiti | n[W ]νt
and
M ′ ≡ N ′ | n[W ′]νt ′ =
∏
i
ni[W ′i ]νit ′i | n[W
′]νt ′
with t ′ > 0 and active(k′,N ′) ≠ t ′ for all k′ ∈ ν ∩ actsnd(N ′). We have to prove that there is kˆ ∈ ν \ nds(N ′) such
that if kˆ ∈ νi, for some i, then t ′i ≥ t ′. By Lemma A.4(1) we have t ′ = t − 1. Since t ′ > 0 it follows that t > 1.
Moreover, by Lemma A.4(3), if W ′i = ⟨w⟩r ′ .Q , for some i, then Wi = ⟨w⟩r .Q , with r ′ = r − 1. As a consequence,
actsnd(N ′) ⊆ actsnd(N). By Lemma A.4(3) if active(k′,N ′) ≠ t ′ then active(k′,N) ≠ t ′ + 1 = t . Notice also that
active(k,N) = 1 for all k ∈ actsnd(N) \ actsnd(N ′). Thus, since t > 1 for all k ∈ ν ∩ actsnd(N) it holds that
active(k,N) ≠ t . Since M is exposure consistent it follows that there is kˆ ∈ ν \ nds(N) such that if kˆ ∈ νi, for some
i, then ti ≥ t . Notice that ν \ nds(M) = ν \ nds(M ′). Moreover, by Lemma A.4(1) we have t ′i = ti − 1, for all i. This
allows us to derive that there is kˆ ∈ ν \ nds(N ′) such that if kˆ ∈ νi, for some i, then t ′i ≥ t ′.
• LetM τ−−→ M ′ by an application of rule (τ -Par). It follows immediately by an application of the inductive hypothesis. 
Let us prove now that our LTS preserves transmission consistency.
Proposition A.6 (Transmission Consistency). Let M be both an exposure consistent and a transmission consistent network. If
M
λ−−→ M ′ then M ′ is transmission consistent.
Proof. Let us consider all the possible values of λ.
• Let M m!v−−−→ M ′. We have to prove that M ′ respects the clauses of Definition 2.8. Let examine the three clauses one by
one.
– Clause 1. Let
M ′ ≡ N ′ | n[(x)w.Q ]νnt ′n =
∏
i
ni[W ′i ]νit ′i | n[(x)w.Q ]
νn
t ′n
withw ≠ ⊥. We have to prove that | actsnd(N ′) ∩ ν |≤ 1. By Lemma A.3(2) we have
M ′ ≡ N ′ | n[(x)w.Q ]νnt ′n ≡
∏
j
nj[W ′j ]νjt ′j | m[⟨v⟩
δv .P]νmt ′m | n[(x)w.Q ]
νn
t ′n
and
M ≡ N | n[W ]νnt ′n =
∏
j
nj[Wj]νjtj | m[!⟨v⟩.P]νmtm | n[W ]νntn
for appropriate processes and tags.
There are two possibilities.
∗ If m /∈ νn then by Lemma A.3(3) we have W = (x)w.Q . By Lemmas A.3(6) and A.3(7) we have actsnd(N ′) =
actsnd(N) ∪ {m}. SinceM is transmission consistent, we have | actsnd(N) ∩ νn |≤ 1. Since m /∈ νn it follows that
| actsnd(N ′) ∩ νn |≤ 1.
∗ Ifm ∈ ν then by Lemma A.3(5) it follows thatW is not active sender and tn = 0. By Lemmas A.3(6) and A.3(7) we
have actsnd(N ′) = actsnd(N)∪ {m}. Since tn = 0,m ∈ νn, andM is exposure consistent, clause 3 of Definition 2.7
allows to derive that actsnd(N ′) ∩ νn = {m}. Hence, | actsnd(N ′) ∩ νn |≤ 1.
– Clause 2. Let
M ′ ≡
∏
i
ni[W ′i ]νit ′i | h[⟨w1⟩
r .P]νht ′h | n[(x)w2 .Q ]
νn
t ′n
with h ∈ νn andw2 ≠ ⊥. We have to show thatw2 = w1 and r = t ′n. There are two cases.
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1. Suppose h ≠ m. In this case, by Lemma A.3(2) we have the following situation:
M ′ ≡
∏
j
nj[W ′j ]νjt ′j | m[⟨v⟩
δv .R]νmt ′m | h[⟨w1⟩
r .P]νht ′h | n[(x)w2 .Q ]
νn
t ′n
and
M ≡
∏
j
nj[Wj]νjtj | m[!⟨v⟩.R]νmtm | h[⟨w1⟩r .P]νhth | n[W ]νntn
for appropriate processes and tags.
Now, there are two sub-cases.
(a) If m /∈ νn then by Lemma A.3(3) we have W = (x)w2 .Q and t ′n = tn. Since M is transmission consistent we
derivew2 = w1 and r = t ′n.
(b) If m ∈ νn then by Lemma A.3(5) we have tn = 0. However, since M is exposure consistent by clause 3 of
Definition 2.7 it must be tn > 0. So, this case is not possible.
2. Suppose h = m. This case easily follows by an application of Lemma A.3(2) and Lemma A.3(5).
– Clause 3. Let
M ′ ≡ N ′ | n[(x)w.P]νnt ′n =
∏
i
ni[W ′i ]νit ′i | n[(x)w.P]
νn
t ′n
with | actsnd(N ′) ∩ νn |> 1. We want to show thatw = ⊥. By an application of Lemma A.3(2) it holds that
M ′ ≡
∏
j
nj[W ′j ]νjt ′j | m[⟨v⟩
δv .Q ]νmt ′m | n[(x)w.P]
νn
t ′n
and
M ≡
∏
j
nj[Wj]νjtj | m[!⟨v⟩.Q ]νmtm | n[W ]νntn
for appropriate processes and tags. Since | actsnd(N ′)∩νn |> 1, it must beW ′j = ⟨wj⟩r .Pj, for some j. By Lemma A.3(6)
we derive thatWj = W ′j . At this point we reason by contradiction. Suppose w ≠ ⊥. Then, by Lemma A.3(5) we have
tn = 0. However, since M is exposure consistent, by clause 3 of Definition 2.7 it must be tn > 0. This contradiction
allows us to conclude thatw = ⊥.
• LetM m?v−−−→ M ′. We have to prove thatM ′ respect the clauses of Definition 2.8.
– Clause 1. Let
M ′ ≡ N ′ | n[(x)w.Q ]νnt ′n =
∏
i
ni[W ′i ]νit ′i | n[(x)w.Q ]
νn
t ′n
withw ≠ ⊥. We have to prove that | actsnd(N ′) ∩ νn |≤ 1. There are two possibilities.
∗ Ifm /∈ νn then by Lemma A.3(3) we have
M ≡ N | n[(x)w.Q ]νntn =
∏
i
ni[Wi]νiti | n[(x)w.Q ]νntn .
Since M is transmission consistent, we have | actsnd(N) ∩ νn |≤ 1. By Lemmas A.3(6) and A.3(7) we derive
actsnd(N ′) = actsnd(N). This allows us to derive that | actsnd(N ′) ∩ νn |≤ 1.
∗ Ifm ∈ νn, sincew ≠ ⊥, by Lemma A.3(5) we have
M ≡ N | n[W ]νn0 =
∏
i
ni[Wi]νiti | n[W ]νn0
where t ′n = δv and W is not an active receiver. By Lemmas A.3(6) and A.3(7) we derive actsnd(N ′) = actsnd(N).
Since M is exposure consistent, by clause 3 of Definition 2.7 we derive | actsnd(N) ∩ νn |= 0. As a consequence,
| actsnd(N ′) ∩ νn |= 0.
– Clause 2. Let
M ′ ≡
∏
i
ni[W ′i ]νit ′i | h[⟨w1⟩
r .P]νht ′h | n[(x)w2 .Q ]
νn
t ′n
with h ∈ νn and w2 ≠ ⊥. We have to show that w2 = w1 and r = t ′n. By Lemma A.3(1) we have h ≠ m. By
Lemma A.3(7) we have
M ≡
∏
i
ni[Wi]νiti | h[⟨w1⟩r .P]νhth | n[W ]νntn
for appropriate processes and tags. Now, there are two cases.
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∗ If m ∉ νn then by Lemma A.3(3) we haveW = (x)w2 .Q and t ′n = tn. Since M is transmission consistent it follows
thatw2 = w1 and t ′n = r .
∗ If m ∈ νn then by Lemma A.3(5) we have tn = 0. Since M is exposure consistent, by clause 3 of Definition 2.7 it
should be tn > 0. This contradiction shows that this case is not possible.
– Clause 3. Let
M ′ ≡ N ′ | n[(x)w.P]νnt ′n =
∏
i
ni[W ′i ]νit ′i | n[(x)w.P]
νn
t ′n
with | actsnd(N ′) ∩ νn |> 1. We have to show thatw = ⊥. By Lemma A.3 we have
M ≡
∏
i
ni[Wi]νiti | n[W ]νntn
for appropriate processes and tags. Since | actsnd(N ′) ∩ νn |> 1 it follows that W ′j = ⟨wj⟩rj .Pj and W ′k = ⟨wk⟩rk .Pk,
for some j and k such that {nj, nk} ⊆ νn. By Lemma A.3(1) and Lemma A.3(7) we have Wj = W ′j and Wk = W ′k. At
this point we reason by contradiction. Suppose w ≠ ⊥. Then, by Lemma A.3(5) we have tn = 0. However, sinceM is
exposure consistent, by clause 3 of Definition 2.7 it must be tn > 0. This contradiction allows us to derive thatw = ⊥.
• LetM σ−−→ M ′. We have to prove thatM ′ respects the clauses of Definition 2.8. Let us examine the three clauses one by
one.
– Clause 1. Let
M ′ ≡ N ′ | n[(x)w.Q ]νnt ′n =
∏
i
ni[W ′i ]νit ′i | n[(x)w.Q ]
νn
t ′n
withw ≠ ⊥. We have to prove that | actsnd(N ′) ∩ νn |≤ 1. By Lemma A.4(2), sincew ≠ ⊥, it must be
M ≡ N | n[(x)w.Q ]νntn =
∏
i
ni[Wi]νiti | n[(x)w.Q ]νntn
SinceM is transmission consistent it follows that | actsnd(N)∩ ν |≤ 1. By Lemma A.4(3) it follows that actsnd(N ′) ⊆
actsnd(N). This implies | actsnd(N ′) ∩ ν |≤ 1.
– Clause 2. Let
M ′ ≡
∏
i
ni[W ′i ]νit ′i | h[⟨w1⟩
r .P]νht ′h | n[(x)w2 .Q ]
νn
t ′n
with h ∈ νn and w2 ≠ ⊥. We have to show that w2 = w1 and r = t ′n. Since w2 ≠ ⊥, by Lemmas A.4(1), A.4(2) and
A.4(3)
M ≡
∏
i
ni[Wi]νiti | h[⟨w1⟩r+1.P]νhth | n[(x)w2 .Q ]νnt ′n+1.
SinceM is transmission consistent we havew2 = w1 and r + 1 = t ′n + 1. As a consequence, r = t ′n.
– Clause 3. Let
M ′ ≡ N ′ | n[(x)w.P]νnt ′n =
∏
i
ni[W ′i ]νit ′i | n[(x)w.P]
νn
t ′n
with | actsnd(N ′) ∩ νn |> 1. We have to show that w = ⊥. By an application of Lemma A.4(2) there are two
possibilities:
∗ Either
M ≡ N | n[(x)w.P]νntn =
∏
i
ni[Wi]νiti | n[(x)w.P]νntn .
In this case, by Lemma A.4(3) it follows that actsnd(N ′) ⊆ actsnd(N). Thus | actsnd(N ′) ∩ νn |> 1 implies
| actsnd(N) ∩ νn |> 1. SinceM is transmission consistent it follows thatw = ⊥.
∗ Or
M ≡ N | n[W ]νntn =
∏
i
ni[Wi]νiti | n[W ]νntn
whereW is not an active receiver andw = ⊥.
• LetM τ−−→ M ′ by an application of rule (τ -Par). It follows immediately by an application of Proposition 2.4(4). 
Finally, every thing is in place to prove that network well-formedness is preserved at run time.
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Proof of Theorem 2.10. The proof follows by an application of Propositions A.1, A.2, A.5 and A.6. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. By induction on the length of the proof of M
σ−−→ M ′. The base cases are when the transition is
derived by the application of one of the rules of Table 4 but rule (σ -Par). It is straightforward to prove that the statement
holds for these rules. As to the inductive case, letM
σ−−→ M ′ by an application of rule (σ -Par). This implies thatM = M1 | M2,
for some M1 and M2, with M1
σ−−→ M ′1, M2
σ−−→ M ′2 and M ′ = M ′1 | M ′2. As M = M1 | M2, the transition M
σ−−→ M ′′ can be
derived only by applying rule (σ -Par) whereM1
σ−−→ M ′′1 ,M2
σ−−→ M ′′2 andM ′′ = M ′′1 | M ′′2 . By inductive hypothesis it holds
thatM ′i andM
′′
i are syntactically the same, for i ∈ {1, 2}. This implies thatM ′ andM ′′ are syntactically the same. 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. By induction on the structure of M . If M = 0 the statement does not apply. Let M be composed
by only one node with M
m!v−−−→ N . In this case the transition can only be derived by an application of rule (Snd) where
M = m[!⟨v⟩.P]νt , for some P , ν and t , and N = m[⟨v⟩δv .P]νt . Because sender nodes cannot perform σ -actions, there is no
networkM ′ such thatM
σ−−→ M ′. LetM be composed by at least two nodes. IfM m!v−−−→ N then by an application of rule (Sync)
we have M = M1 | M2 for some M1 and M2, with M1 m!v−−−→ M ′1, M2
m?v−−−→ M ′2 and N = M ′1 | M ′2 (the converse is similar).
In this case the only rule for deriving a σ -transition from M is (σ -Par). However, the inductive hypothesis guarantees that
M1
σ−−→ M for no network M; thusM σ−−→ M ′ for no networkM ′. 
In order to prove Theorem 3.3 on the Patience property, we use the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma A.7. Let M be a well-formed network. If M
m!v−−−→ M ′ then for all network N such that M | N is a well-formed network
it holds that M | N m!v−−−→ M ′ | N ′ for some network N ′.
Proof. The result follows by Proposition 2.4(1) and an application of rule (Sync). 
Proof of Theorem 3.3. By contradiction and then by induction on the structure of M . We prove that if M
σ−−→ N for no
network N thenM
m!v−−−→ M ′ for some networkM ′. Let us proceed by induction on the structure ofM .
• LetM = 0. ThenM σ−−→ M by an application of rule (σ -Zero). So, the statement does not apply.
• LetM = n[W ]νt . We proceed by induction on the structure ofW .
– IfW = nil thenM σ−−→ n[nil]νt−1 by an application of rule (σ -Nil). Thus, the statement does not apply.
– IfW = σ .P thenM σ−−→ n[P]νt−1 by an application of rules (Sleep). Then, the statement does not apply.
– IfW = !⟨v⟩.P then by inspection on the rules of Table 4M σ−−→ N for no network N . However,M m!v−−−→ m[⟨v⟩δv .P]νt ,
by an application of rule (Snd), as expected.
– IfW = ⌊?(x).P⌋Q and t = 0 thenM σ−−→ n[Q ]ν0 , by an application of rule (σ -Rcv). Then, the statement does not apply.
– If W = ⌊?(x).P⌋Q and t > 0 then M σ−−→ n[(x)⊥.P]νt−1, by an application of rule (σ -Fail). Then, the statement does
not apply.
– IfW = ⌊τ .P⌋Q thenM σ−−→ n[Q ]νt−1, by an application of rule (σ -Tau). Then, the statement does not apply.
– IfW = [v = v]P1, P2 then by an application of rule (Then)we can apply the inductive hypothesis to conclude that we
fall in one of the previous cases.
– If W = [v1 = v2]P1, P2, with v1 ≠ v2, by an application of rule (Else) we can apply the inductive hypothesis to
conclude that we fall in one of the previous cases.
– If W = H⟨v˜⟩ the constraint of guarded recursion ensures us that by an application of rule (Rec) we can apply the
inductive hypothesis and we fall in one of the previous cases.
– If W = ⟨v⟩r .P (by definition r > 0) then by an application of rule (ActSnd) we have M σ−−→ n[⟨v⟩r−1.P]νt−1 and the
statement does not apply.
– If W = (x)v.P , with t > 0, then by an application of rule (ActRcv) we have M σ−−→ n[(x)v.P]νt−1 and the statement
does not apply.
– IfW = (x)v.P , with t = 0, then by an application of rule (RcvEnd) we haveM σ−−→ n[{v/x}P]ν0 and the statement does
not apply.
• Let M = M1 | M2. A transition of the form M σ−−→ M ′ can be derived only by an application of rule (σ -Par). Thus if M
cannot perform a σ -action then at least one of the premises of rule (σ -Par) does not hold:
– IfM1
σ−−→ M ′1 for no networkM ′1, then by inductive hypothesis we haveM1
m!v−−−→ M ′1, for someM ′1. AsM = M1 | M2
is a well-formed network, by Lemma A.7 it holds that M
m!v−−−→ M ′1 | M ′2, for some M ′2, in contradiction with the
hypothesis.
– IfM2
σ−−→ M ′2 for no networkM ′2, then we can reason as in the previous sub-case. 
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Proof of Proposition 4.1. By inspection of the code, if the receiver node n[P jk]νnt sends amessage authi to authenticate packet
pi in a generic epoch k then either k = i or k = 1+ i. By definition, the packet pi is (originally) sent by the senderm at epoch
i (the attacker may replay the same packet later on). This suffices to conclude the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4.2. The proof proceeds by contradiction. We show that if #σ (Λ2) > 2∆N + 3∆T then the packet
pi sent by m cannot be authenticated by n. Suppose the sender node m[S ji ]νmt sends its ciphertext pi at epoch i and offset j.
Without loss of generality, we can suppose 1 ≤ ∆T ≤ δpi ≤ ∆N . Since #σ (Λ2) > 2∆N + 3∆T , the receiver process Rji
must miss the synchronisation with S ji . Then, after #
σ (Λ2) instants of time the receiver node n[Rj′i′ ]νnt ′ starts receiving the
packet pi (from the attacker), with i′ = i + 1 and j′ = j + #σ (Λ2) − E, if j + #σ (Λ2) − E < E, and i′ = i + 2 and
j′ = j + #σ (Λ2) − 2E, if j + #σ (Λ2) − E ≥ E. The receiver node terminates receiving the packet pi, in some state of the
form P j
′′
i′′ . Since #
σ (Λ2) > 2∆N + 3∆T and 1 ≤ ∆T ≤ δpi . It follows that i′′ ≥ i+ 2. However, by inspection of the code, in
an epoch greater than or equal as i+ 2 the receiver node cannot send the message authi to authenticate a packet of epoch i.
This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 6.3. We prove that the relation
S
def= {M | O , N | O : M ≈ N, M | O and N | Owell-formed }
is a bisimulation. We proceed by case analysis on whyM | O α−−→ Z . The interesting cases are when the transition is due to
an interaction betweenM and O. The remaining cases are simpler.
• LetM | O !v◃ν−−−−→ M , by an application of rule (Out) becauseM | O m!v−−−→ M , with ν = ngh(m,M | O) \ nds(M | O) and
ν ≠ ∅. There are two possible cases:
– M | O m!v−−−→ M is derived by an application of rule (Sync) because M m!v−−−→ M ′ and O m?v−−−→ O′, with M = M ′ | O′.
Since M
m!v−−−→ M ′, by Proposition 2.4(3) it follows that m ∈ nds(M). As M | O is well-formed, by node-uniqueness,
it follows that m ∉ nds(O), and hence ngh(m,M | O) = ngh(m,M). As nds(M | O) = nds(M) ∪ nds(O), it follows
that ν = (ngh(m,M) \ nds(M)) \ nds(O). Let ν ′ = ngh(m,M) \ nds(M). Since ν ≠ ∅ it follows that ν ′ ≠ ∅. Since
ν ′ ≠ ∅ and M m!v−−−→ M ′, by an application of rule (Out) we have M !v◃ν
′
−−−−→ M ′. Now, since M ≈ N there is N ′ such
that N !v◃ν
′HHHH⇒ N ′ withM ′ ≈ N ′. Since the action !v◃ν ′ can be generated only by an application of rule (Out), there is
h ∈ nds(N) such that N h!vHHH⇒ N ′ and ν ′ = ngh(h,N) \ nds(N) ≠ ∅. We recall that N | O is well-formed. This implies:
∗ h /∈ nds(O), by node-uniqueness;
∗ ν ′ ⊆ ngh(h,N);
∗ If k ∈ ν ′ ∩ nds(O) then h ∈ ngh(k,O), because the neighbouring relation is symmetric (by Definition 2.6).
This implies that O
h?v−−−→ O′. By an application of rule (Sync) and several applications of rule (TauPar) we have N |
O h!vHHH⇒ N ′ | O′. Since h ∉ nds(O) it follows that ngh(h,N | O) = ngh(h,N).We recall that ν ′ = ngh(h,M)\nds(M) =
ngh(h,N) \ nds(N). Thus, we have the following sequence of equalities:
ν = ngh(m,M | O) \ nds(M | O)
= ngh(m,M) \ nds(M | O)
= (ngh(m,M) \ nds(M)) \ nds(O)
= (ngh(h,N) \ nds(N)) \ nds(O)
= ngh(h,N | O) \ nds(N | O)
≠ ∅.
As ν ≠ ∅, by an application of rule (Out) we have N | O !v◃νHHHH⇒ N ′ | O′. By Theorem 2.10, bothM ′ | O′ and N ′ | O′ are
well-formed. AsM ′ ≈ N ′ it follows that M ′ | O′ , N ′ | O′ ∈ S.
– M | O m!v−−−→ M , by an application of rule (Sync), because M m?v−−−→ M ′ and O m!v−−−→ O′, with M = M ′ | O′. Since
O
m!v−−−→ O′, by Proposition 2.4(3) it follows that m ∈ nds(O), and hence ν = (ngh(m,O) \ nds(O)) \ nds(M). Since
M ≈ N there is N ′ such that N m?vHHH⇒ N ′ with M ′ ≈ N ′. By several applications of rule (TauPar) and one application
of rule (Sync) (in its symmetric version) it follows that N | O m!vHHH⇒ N ′ | O′. By Proposition 6.2, M ≈ N implies that
nds(M) = nds(N). Moreover, sinceM | O and N | O are well-formed andm ∈ nds(O), by node uniqueness it follows
thatm ∉ nds(M) andm ∉ nds(N). Thus,
ngh(m,N | O) \ nds(N | O) = (ngh(m,O) \ nds(O)) \ nds(N)
= (ngh(m,O) \ nds(O)) \ nds(M)
= ngh(m,M | O) \ nds(M | O)
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= ν
≠ ∅.
With this premise, by an application of rule (Out) we can derive N | O !v◃νHHHH⇒ N ′ | O′. By Theorem 2.10, both M ′ | O′
and N ′ | O′ are well-formed. AsM ′ ≈ N ′ it follows that M ′ | O′ , N ′ | O′ ∈ S.
• Let M | O τ−−→ M , by an application of rule (Shh), because M | O m!v−−−→ M and ngh(m,M | O) ⊆ nds(M | O). There are
two possible cases:
– Let M | O m!v−−−→ M , by an application of rule (Sync), because M m!v−−−→ M ′ and O m?v−−−→ O′, with M = M ′ | O′. As
m ∈ nds(M) andM | O is well-formed it follows thatm ∉ nds(O). Thus,
ngh(m,M | O) \ nds(M | O) = (ngh(m,M) \ nds(M)) \ nds(O) = ∅.
Again there are two possibilities:
∗ Let ngh(m,M) \ nds(M) = ∅. Then, since M m!v−−−→ M ′, by an application of rule (Shh) we have M τ−−→ M ′. Since
M ≈ N there is N ′ such that N H⇒ N ′ andM ′ ≈ N ′. We know that O m?v−−−→ O′. Let us assume O ≠ 0 (the case when
O = 0 is simple). By definition of our networks there are ni,Wi, νi, and ti, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, such thatO =∏ki=1 ni[Wi]νiti .
Since O
m?v−−−→ O′ by Proposition 2.4(2), for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, there areW ′i , ν ′i , and t ′i such that
ni[Wi]νiti
m?v−−−→ ni[W ′i ]ν
′
i
t ′i
and O′ = ∏ki=1 ni[W ′i ]ν′it ′i . Since M | O is well-formed, by node-uniqueness it follows that ni ∉ nds(M) for all i,
1 ≤ i ≤ k. Now, since
· ngh(m,M) \ nds(M) = ∅
· ni ∉ nds(M), for all i
· M | O is connected and the neighbouring relation is symmetric (see clause 2 of Definition 2.6)
it follows thatm ∉ νi, for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. This implies that the transitions
ni[Wi]νiti
m?v−−−→ ni[W ′i ]ν
′
i
t ′i
can only be derived by applying rule (OutRng) withW ′i = Wi, ν ′i = νi and t ′i = ti. This implies O′ = O. Now, since
N H⇒ N ′, by several applications of rule (TauPar) it follows that N | O H⇒ N ′ | O = N ′ | O′. By Theorem 2.10, both
M ′ | O′ and N ′ | O′ are well-formed. AsM ′ ≈ N ′ it follows that M ′ | O′ , N ′ | O′ ∈ S.
∗ Let ν ′ = ngh(m,M) \ nds(M) ≠ ∅. The reasoning in this sub-case is very similar to that done in the first case
(when α = !v◃ν) of this proof.
– LetM | O m!v−−−→ M , by an application of rule (Sync) becauseM m?v−−−→ M ′ and O m!v−−−→ O′, with M = M ′ | O′. This case
is similar to a previous one.
• Let M | O m?v−−−→ M , by an application of rule (RcvPar), because M m?v−−−→ M ′, O m?v−−−→ O′ and M = M ′ | O′. This case is
easy.
• LetM | O σ−−→ M by an application of rule (σ -Par) becauseM σ−−→ M ′, O σ−−→ O′ and M = M ′ | O′. This case is easy. 
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